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Abstract
Under both a cap-and-trade system and a greenhouse gas tax, the
government will regulate energy suppliers and distributors, utility companies,
and large manufacturers. These parties will bear the statutory incidence of the
regulation. However, the financial impacts of regulating greenhouse gas
emissions will be borne primarily by consumers. Consumers will bear the
economic incidence of the regulation in the form of increased costs ofgasoline,
electricity, and home heating fuels and in increased consumer prices for all
goods manufactured or distributed using fossil fuels. Greenhouse gas
regulation will also generate significant revenue. This Article addresses the
question of what should be done with those revenues. Models of the economic
incidence of the two systems indicate that while high-income households will
bear a larger portion of the distributional impacts because they consume more,
low-income households will bear a disproportionate burden as a percentage of
their household income. In view of the political challenges associated with
redistribution, the practical challenges associated with calculating the net
burdens of environmental regulation, and the central importance ofprotecting
the least advantaged in society, this Article proposes that the optimal
regulatory regime is one that neutralizes the distributional impacts. The
government may achieve this by capturing revenues from a cap-and-trade
system or a greenhouse gas tax and using those revenues to issue a rebate that
is proportional to household income and scaled according to household size.
This Article also suggests that the most efficient method for delivering the
rebate is by issuing a refundable tax credit through the income tax system,
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based on the institutional compatibility of that system with the regulatory and
distributional goals of the policy.
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The international scientific and political communities have reached
general consensus that greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities
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are likely to have dangerous, long-term impacts on the global climate and have
concluded that action must be taken to address the causes of climate change if
catastrophic losses are to be avoided.' Finally, after years of delay2 and denial,3
the United States has joined that consensus.
4
1. The global average temperature has increased by 0.6 degrees Celsius since the pre-
industrial era and scientists believe that an increase of between 1.4 and 4.3 degrees Celsius is
now unavoidable. V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic
Interference with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD.
Sci. U.S. 14245, 14245 (2008); see also Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change
Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. U.S. 1704, 1704 (2009)
(reporting that climate change caused by carbon dioxide emissions is largely irreversible for
1,000 years after emissions cease). Scientists with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) predict that a shift of this magnitude likely will result in increased frequency
and severity of extreme weather (such as heat waves, tropical cyclones, floods, droughts,
wildfires, and hurricanes), harm to and loss of unique and threatened environmental systems
(such as alpine areas, glaciers, and coral reefs), and increased risk of large-scale climate shifts
(such as deglaciation of ice sheets, rapid sea-level rise, ocean acidification, and changes in the
circulation system of the ocean). See Joel B. Smith et al., Assessing Dangerous Climate Change
Through an Update of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) "Reasons for
Concern, "106 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. U.S. 4133, 4134-37 (2009) (describing the risks posed
by global climate change, including harm to unique and threatened environmental systems,
extreme weather events, and large-scale discontinuities). For a brief overview of the history of
efforts to address climate change, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than
Cap-and-Trade, 28 STAN. ENvmL. L.J. 3, 14-20 (2009). For a brief overview of the science of
climate change, see Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1673, 1679-87 (2007).
2. During the finalization of the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the
Byrd-Hagel Resolution, stating that it was the sentiment of the Senate that the United States
should not be a signatory to any protocol that would seriously harm the U.S. economy or that
failed to include emissions standards for developing nations. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
3. See Robert F. Rich & Kelly R. Merrick, Use and Misuse of Science: Global Climate
Change and the Bush Administration, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y &L. 223, 231-43 (2007) (reviewing
allegations that the Bush administration censored and suppressed scientific views on global
climate change); Juliet Eilperin, White House Prods Allies to Oppose Limits on Greenhouse
Gases, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2008, at A4 (describing communications from the Bush
administration urging mayors from cities across the United States to oppose emission limits on
greenhouse gases); Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at AlI (detailing claims by the top climate scientist at NASA that the Bush
administration tried to silence his warnings about global warming).
4. Three separate groups of states and Canadian provinces have begun to develop cap-
and-trade systems to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: the Western Climate Initiative (Arizona,
British Columbia, California, Manitoba, Montana, New Mexico, Ontario, Oregon, Quebec,
Utah, and Washington); the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont); and the Midwestern Regional GHG
Reduction Accord (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Manitoba as
full participants; Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota as observers). Both the House and the Senate
have proposed legislation to curb greenhouse gas emissions. See generally American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong.; America's Climate Security Act of
211
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This Article concerns itself with the distributional impacts, or the
"economic incidence," of climate change policy in the United States.5 The
Article first explains what "incidence" is and examines economic incidence
under the various regulatory schemes that might be used to address climate
change. A number of existing economic studies model the incidence of carbon
taxes, greenhouse gas taxes, and cap-and-trade systems. This Article differs
from those studies in that it compares data from the various incidence models,
examines climate change proposals in light of the theory underlying equity and
efficiency concerns, and proposes both a regulatory scheme and a delivery
mechanism designed to balance those concerns. The Article argues that the
best regulatory scheme will be one in which the government neutralizes the
distributional impacts of climate change policy by (a) capturing the revenues or
scarcity rents that result from the regulatory regime, and (b) redistributing those
revenues or rents to households in a manner designed to offset the distributional
impacts of the policy. The Article suggests that the best policy is one that
neutralizes the distributional impacts by delivering a rebate that is proportional
to the incidence at each decile of income, and scaled according to household
size. Finally, the Article argues that the rebate would be most effectively
delivered through the income tax system as a refundable tax credit.
The Article is organized as follows: Part 11 reviews the different forms of
environmental regulation (command-and-control regulation, emissions trading
systems, and excise taxes on greenhouse gas emissions), explains how
incidence varies based on the form of regulation used, and pulls from the
economic literature to identify the distributional consequences of both a cap-
and-trade regime and a greenhouse gas tax. Part III examines the theoretical
underpinnings of alternative policy choices in offsetting the distributional
2007, S. 219 1, 110Oth Cong.; Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110Oth Cong.; Global
Warming Reduction Act, S. 485, 1 10th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Pollution Reduction
Act, S. 309, 1 10th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280,
1 10th Cong.; Keep America Competitive Global Warming Policy Act of 2006, H.R. 5049,
109th Cong.; and Safe Climate Act of 2006, H.R. 5642, 109th Cong. In his first State of the
Union address to Congress, President Barack Obania voiced his support for a cap on carbon
dioxide emissions. See Posting of Kate Galbraith to the N.Y. Times Green Inc. blog,
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/obama-vows-support-for-renewables-and-a-
carbon-cap/ (Feb. 25, 2009, 6:57 EST) (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) ("Mr. Obama clearly stated
his support for a cap on carbon dioxide emissions: 'I ask this Congress to send me legislation
that places a market-based cap on carbon pollution and drives the production of more renewable
energy in America,' he said.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In response
to this call, the House of Representatives recently passed the American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009. H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong. (as passed by House, Jun. 26, 2009).
5. While any international emissions trading regime that ultimately may be developed
will alter the pattern of incidence within the United States, this Article does not address
incidence under international trading.
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impacts, outlines the equity and efficiency debate, and concludes that these
concerns are best addressed by providing a rebate that achieves distributional
neutrality. The Article then identifies the optimal method for delivering that
rebate based on institutional compatibility. Part IV concludes the Article.
II. Incidence of Climate Change Policy
In economic terms, the environmental effects of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are "externalities." An externality occurs
when the actions of one individual or firm have a direct, unintended impact on
another party for which that party has not been compensated.6 Although
society benefits from using fossil fuels, there is a social cost: Pollution in the
form of greenhouse gases. Society enjoys a net gain in welfare as long as the
social benefits from using fossil fuels are greater than the social costs of the
harms caused by greenhouse gases. Problems arise when the individuals who
enjoy the benefits of an activity are not the same as those who bear the costs of
that activity. When the costs are shifted to others, they are said to be
"externalized" and the harm is said to be a "negative externality." 7 When the
harm caused by climate change is not included in the price of fossil fuels, the
price for those fuels is too low, demand is too high, too many fossil fuels are
used, too many goods are produced, and the harm from the resulting pollution
exceeds the benefits from having access to the fuel and goods.8
The goal of much environmental regulation is to restore the balance
between the social benefits of a polluting good and the social costs of pollution.
There are a number of ways governments have sought to restore this balance.
The primary instruments include command-and-control systems, cap-and-trade
systems, and excise taxes on the polluting goods.9 Alternate regulatory regimes
may result in a different distribution of economic impacts among the various
segments of the U.S. population. i general, these impacts are not considered
6. See NATHANIEL 0. KEOHANE & SHEILA M. OLMSTEAD, MARKETS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 66 (2007) ("An externality results when the actions of one individual (or firm)
have a direct, unintentional, and uncompensated effect on the well-being of other individuals or
the profits of other firms.").
7. See id at 65 (stating that a negative externality results when an activity indirectly
imposes costs on a downstream party).
8. See id at 67-70 (describing how a negative externality such as pollution is a market
failure).
9. See Don Fullerton, A Framework to Compare Environmental Policies, 68 S. EcoN. J.
224, 230-37 (2001) (describing eight major policy options for environmental regulation).
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in decisions about whether to regulate.'0 Economists tend to ignore
distributional impacts: Because the goal of economics is to maximize
efficiency (enlarge the pie), they leave redistribution issues (division of the
pie) to the tax and transfer system." Because the process of maximizing
efficiency can result in significant changes to the way the pie is divided,
governments undertake redistribution. To do so, however, policymnakers
must identify the distributive consequences of the policy to society as a whole
and ascertain the way the costs and benefits of the policy are allocated
throughout the population.'1
2
Each of the three main policy instruments for managing climate change
distributes the benefits and the burdens differently. That is, each legislative
structure may produce a different pattern of incidence. Before discussing
these differences, this Article will provide a brief overview of economic
incidence.
A. What Is Incidence?
When legislators impose a tax or regulation, the person on whom the tax
or regulation is levied (the party responsible for turning the tax over to the
government or for complying with the regulation) bears only the "statutory
incidence" of the legislation; the economic incidence-the financial burden
of the tax or regulation-may fall on others. '3 Ultimately, only human beings
10. See RICHARD L. REvEsz & MICHAEL A. LIVERmoRE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How
COST-BENEFIT ANALsis CAN BErrER PRO=EC THE ENVIRONmENT AND OuR HEALTH 181 (2008)
("In general, economic analysis tends to disregard distributional impacts, favoring wealth-
maximizing regulation regardless of how that wealth is distributed.").
11. See id. (indicating that economic theory focuses on maximizing the net benefits of the
regulation, but leaves the tax-and-transfer system to achieve a desirable distribution of
resources).
12. See id. (noting that for a "centralized redistributive mechanism to work properly, there
must be an understanding of the net distributive consequences of the regulatory system, that is,
how the cumulative costs and benefits of regulations are borne by the American public and its
many subpopulations").
13. See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 519 (2005) (defining
statutory incidence and economic incidence and stating the rule that "the statutory burden of a
tax does not describe who really bears the tax"). Note that this definition assumes that one of
the goals of government is to maximize well-being and that well-being may be measured, at
least in part, by income and the number of individuals in a household unit that share that
income. It further assumes that well-being is enhanced by use of that income through
consumption. Views to the contrary are emerging, however. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen &
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Consumption, Happiness, and Climate Change, 38 ENvTL. L. REP.
10834, 10837 (2008) (arguing that utility is enhanced not only by consumption, but by access to
resources that are not currently being measured, including leisure, health, family, and
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bear these financial burdens.'14 The costs associated with climate change
regulation incurred by a firm, such as an energy supplier, utility company, or
manufacturing facility, will either be passed forward to consumers as
increased prices for electricity, fuels, and consumer goods, or passed
backward to investors (suppliers of capital) as lower returns on investment, to
workers (suppliers of labor) as lower wages, or to owners of the fossil fuel
resources (owners of coal mines and oil and natural gas wells) as reduction in
the value of these resources.'15 As between producers and consumers, the
economic burden of regulation will fall on the party with the least elastic
response to the regulation.'1
6
Elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of the quantity of a good
demanded to a change in price for that good.'17 In the tax context, elasticity is
a measure of the extent to which an individual or group seeks to avoid the
impact of a tax or regulation.' 8 When a tax or regulation is imposed on
greenhouse gases, it increases the price of fossil fuel-based energy supplies
and increases the prices of other goods and services manufactured through
their use. If, in response to a small price increase, a population changes its
consumption pattern by shifting to substitutes or by consuming less, it has a
highly elastic response. If, in response to large price increase, the population
does not respond, it has a highly inelastic response. A number of factors
impact the elasticity: (1) the availability of substitutes;' 9 (2) the duration of
community); Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change and
Consumption, 3 8 ENvTL. L. REP. 10825, 10825-29 (2008) (outlining the role that considerations
for consumption have played in environmental policy and the assumptions underlying the
current debate between conservation and economic growth).
14. See GRUBER, supra note 13, at 518, 667 (explaining that while corporations remit
corporate taxes to the government, individuals-such as consumers, workers, and investors-
actually bear the corporate tax burden).
15. See Kevin A. Hassett, Aparna Mathur & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Incidence of a US.
Carbon Tax: A Lifetime andRegional Analysis, 30 ENERGY J. 155, 159 (2009) ("The final issue
in an incidence analysis is how to allocate the tax burden between consumers and producers.
Taxes on energy can be passed forward into higher consumer prices or backward in the form of
lower returns to factors of supply (capital, labor, and resource owners).").
16. See GRUBER, supra note 13, at 525 ("Parties with inelastic supply or demand bear
taxes; parties with elastic supply or demand avoid them.").
17. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RuBINFELD, MICROECONOMICs 32-3 3 (6th ed.
2005) (explaining that price elasticity of demand is a measure that reflects the change in demand
for a good as a function of its change in price).
18. See GRUBER, supra note 13, at 524-27 (explaining that the elasticities of supply and
demand ultimately determine who will bear the burden of taxes and who will be able to avoid
them).
19. See HAL R_ VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONomics, A MODERN APPROACH 272 (7th
ed. 2006) ("[Tlhe elasticity of demand for a good depends to a large extent on how many close
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the price increase ;20 (3) the degree to which the good is essential ;2' (4) whether
the good is a durable good (a good with a useful life greater than three years),
which tracks with the significance of the good as part of the household
budget;22 and (5) the breadth of the tax .23 In the context of climate change
legislation, if a tax is levied on fossil fuels, elasticity will increase as more
alternative energy substitutes become available. The longer the tax is imposed,
the more time households have to take measures to avoid the impact of the
increase in the price of fossil fuels (such as weatherizing or purchasing more
fuel efficient vehicles). If a good is necessary, households will simply pay the
higher price, though they may take more care in purchasing goods that
comprise a larger share of their budgets in order to reduce the impact of the
costs of those goods. The broader the tax and the more goods covered by the
tax, the more difficult it becomes for households to avoid the impact of the tax.
Recently, a number of economic studies have been developed to model the
economic incidence of climate change.2 Most of these studies of both excise
substitutes it has.").
20. See PINDYCK & RuBINFELD, supra note 17, at 38 (noting that elasticities change
depending on whether changes in demand are evaluated over the short term or the long term).
2 1. See GRUBER, supra note 13, at 525 (noting that the demand for essential goods is
highly inelastic).
22. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 17, at 38-39 (explaining the relationship
between demand and durability).
23. See GRUBER, supra note 13, at 538 ("[T]axes that are broader based are harder to
avoid than taxes that are narrower, so the response of producers and consumers to the tax will be
smaller and more inelastic.").
24. See Nicholas BulKevin A. Hassett & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Who Pays Broad-Based
Energy Taxes? Computing Lifetime and Regional Incidence, 15 ENERGYJ. 145, 145-47 (1994)
(introducing a model to study the lifetime economic incidence of a BTU (British Thermal Unit)
tax and a carbon tax); CONGRtESSIONAL. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, WHO GAINS AND WHO
PAYS UNDER CARBON-ALLOWANCE TRADING? THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EF'ECTS OF ALTERNATIVE
POLICY DESIGNS, at vii (2000) [hereinafter CBO], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
2lxx/doc2lO4/carbon.pdf ("This study focuses on ... how the costs of U.S. government
policies to reduce C02 emissions .. . would ultimately be distributed among U.S.
households."); Terry Dinan & Diane Lim Rogers, Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance
Trading: How Government Decisions Determine Winners and Losers, 55 NAT'L TAx J. 199,
199-201 (2002) (describing the authors' study, which examines the distributional effects of a
carbon allowance trading program); Ian W.H. Parry, Are Emissions Permits Regressive?, 47 J.
ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 364, 364-67 (2004) (introducing a model to estimate the distributional
effects of emissions permits for carbon, S02, and N02); Gilbert E. Metcalf, A Proposal for a
US. Carbon Tax Swap: An Equitable Tax Reform to Address Global Climate Change 11-21
(Brookings Inst., The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2007-12 2007) [hereinafter
Metcalf (2007)], available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/10carbontax metcalfaspx
(proposing a carbon tax swap to address climate change and evaluating the istributional
impacts of the proposal); Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 155-57 (introducing the authors'
study, which examines the economic incidence of a U.S. carbon tax); Dallas Burtraw, Rich
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taxes and cap-and-trade systems assume that producers will fully shift the
burden of the regulatory regime forward to consumers.2 In the long run,
capital is likely to be perfectly elastic because investors have numerous
alternative options for investing their funds.2 When capital may be invested in
any country in the world, it will flow to other countries in order to avoid the
burden of the tax.2 Labor is also generally held to be perfectly elastic over the
Sweeney & Margaret Walls, The Incidence of Climate Change Policy, Where You Stand
Depends on Where You Sit, at i-ui (Sept. 2008) (unpublished discussion paper, on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review) [hereinafter Burtraw (2008)], available at
http://www.rff.org/RFF/ Documents/RFF-DP-08-28.pdf (summarizing the authors' study of the
economic incidence of a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program); Gilbert E. Metcalf et al.,
Analysis of US Greenhouse Gas Tax Proposals 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13980, 2008) [hereinafter Metcalf (2008)], available at
http://www.nber.org/ papers/w13980 (introducing the authors' study, which examines the
economic effects and distributional impacts of cap-and-trade systems and emissions taxes);
Dallas Burtraw, Rich Sweeney & Margaret Walls, The Incidence of Climate Change Policy,
Alternative Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auction 1-3 (Apr. 2009, rev. June 2009)
(unpublished discussion paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) [hereinafter
Burtraw (2009)], available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/ RFF-DP-09-17-REV.pdf
(introducing the author's study, which examines the economic incidence of different policy
scenarios for allocating carbon allowances); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF ICE, U.S. CONGRESS,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION To REDUCE GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS (2009)
[hereinafter CBO 2009] (examining the economic impacts of The American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009 on households from compliance costs before and after the application of
revenues from the policy).
25. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (identify'ing studies that assume the cost of
climate change regulation will ultimately be passed on to consumers). But see A. Lans
Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of C02
Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost? 39 (July 2000) (unpublished discussion paper, on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
DocumentslRFF-DP-00-27.pdf (concluding that industry will be able to shift a significant
portion-but not all-of the regulatory burden to consumers). Bovenberg and Goulder
developed their model to determine what it would cost to insulate the profits of key industrial
stakeholders in the coal, oil, and gas industries in order to make regulation politically palatable.
Id at 4. Their model therefore assumed that capital was the only imperfectly elastic factor. Id.
at 3, 40. They argued that while producers can shift onto consumers most of the burden from a
carbon tax, they will bear some of the burden of the carbon tax because the supply is not
infinitely elastic. Id. at 14. They concluded that the government would only need to provide a
small portion of the emissions permits for free to these industries to neutralize the adverse
impacts to capital. Id at 27-28. Note that the impacts that they calculated were from an
unanticipated carbon tax. Id. at 14. If the tax were anticipated, capital would begin to shift
from the time the regulation was announced. At the time any regulation went into effect,
capitalized assets would have settled at a new price that reflected the impact of the regulation
and shareholders would have changed.
26. See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 206 ("In the long run capital and labor would
leave carbon producing industries until returns to factors in those industries reflected returns
throughout the rest of the economy.").
27. See Don Fullterton & Garth Heutel, The General Equilibrium Incidence of
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long run because workers may retool, retrain, and relocate .28  Short-term
impacts may differ.2
Because both capital and labor tend to be highly elastic in the long run,
economic models of the incidence of various climate change regimes predict
that the full burden of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime will be passed
through to consumers directly in higher prices for gasoline, fuel, oil, and
electricity, and indirectly in higher prices for services and goods .30  The
increase in price for a good depends on the amount of energy used to produce
and transport the good to its ultimate destination-the amount of carbon
dioxide or other greenhouse gases imbedded in the item produced .3 1 The total
greenhouse gas tax paid or the total burden of a cap-and-trade regime borne by
a household increases with the household's consumption of fuel, electricity,
and goods.3
B. Policy Instruments for Con trolling Emissions of Greenhouse Gases
There are three primary instruments for regulating environmental
pollution: command-and-control systems, cap-and-trade systems, and excise
Environmental Taxes, 91 J. PUB. EcoN. 571, 588 (2007) ("In a model with perfect international
capital mobility, for example, the net return to capital is fixed by world capital markets, and so
the pollution tax cannot place a burden on capital ... 1.
28. See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 203 (stating the assumption that "in the long
run the supply of labor and capital into the production of carbon is perfectly elastic"). Note that
the assumption that labor is elastic is controversial. See, e.g., GRUBER, supra note 13, at 590-92
(describing economic findings indicating that the elasticity of labor supply varies depending on
such factors as whether the focus is on primary earners or secondary earners, and also noting
that existing studies on labor elasticity are subject to limitations and have not carefully studied
all aspects of the issue).
29. In the short term, there may be high job losses in certain energy sectors, such as coal
mining, or polluting industries that employ low-skill workers. See Parry, supra note 24, at 3 85
(suggesting that "if polluting industries disproportionately employ low-skill workers,
[environmental policies] may impose an additional burden on low-income households"); see
also Bull et al., supra note 24, at 161 (noting other studies that suggest energy taxes may cause
disproportionately more job losses in coal producing regions, but declining to consider whether
those job losses would be permanent or temporary).
30. See CBO, supra note 24, at viii (noting that companies would pass the costs of
carbon-allowance trading on to households by increasing prices on energy and consumer
products); Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 206 (stating that in the long run the entire cost of
carbon allowance purchases would be passed forward to consumers).
31. See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 203 ("Commodity prices increase based on the
amount of carbon associated with their production and consumption. ... ).
32. See id. at 206 (stating that private sector cost increases would be passed onto
households in proportion to their consumption of carbon-intensive goods).
218
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taxes. Cap-and-trade systems and excise taxes are more efficient than
command-and-control systems. 3 The next section explains how the three
schemes work and gives an overview of the economic incidence under each
system.3
1. Command-and-Control Regime
The most common method of environmental regulation in the United
States-a command-and-control regulation-requires firms to limit the
amount of pollution they release into the environment. Under a command-
and-control regime, the two primary mechanisms for controlling pollution are
design standards and performance standards.
Regulators use design standards to ensure that firms install specified
pollution-reducing technology. 35 The costs of the technology are generally
passed forward to consumers and the consumers experience financial burdens
depending on the costs associated with installing and maintaining the
technology. Because the technology to remove carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases from emissions has not been fuilly researched and is not
readily available,3 policymnakers are not likely to implement design standards
33. When evaluating regulatory instruments, policymnakers consider efficiency,
distributional impacts, access to revenues to address those impacts, administrative costs,
enforcement concerns, implications for competition, uncertainty, and flexibility to make
dynamic adjustments. See Fullerton, supra note 9, at 237-45 (describing competing policy
objectives that policymnakers must balance when formulating environmental regulations).
34. For helpful background, see generally KEOHANE & OLMSTEAD, supra note 6,
Fullerton, supra note 9, and GRUBER, supra note 13.
35. See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National
Governments Address a Global Problem 8 (Jan. 1997) (unpublished discussion paper, on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-97-1 1 .pdf ("Technology-based (or design) standards typically require the
use of specified equipment, processes, or procedures.").
36. Note that carbon sequestration-the capture and compression of carbon dioxide gas
for storage in deep geological formations-is currently under research, but has not been
deployed. See Lawrence H. Goulder & William A. Pizer, The Economics of Climate Change 10
(June 2006) (unpublished discussion paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review),
available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documnents/RFF-DP-06-06.pdf ("Geological sequestration
(for example, injection into depleted oil or gas reservoirs) represents a very expensive
proposition now but could be an important component of a long-term policy solution if costs
decline."). The technology generally would be used only at large point sources such as fossil
fuel power plants. Carbon dioxide scrubbers for use in manufacturing are also under research,
but they too have not been implemented at any significant level. See GOP Leaders Press DOE
on Waxman 's C02 Control Target, CCS Timing, ENERGY WASH. WEEK, April 29,2009, at 6-7
(indicating that the EPA analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill assumes that carbon capture and
sequestration technology will be deployed by 2015 and quoting Stephen Chu, Secretary of the
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to address climate change 37 and this Article will not address them in any
depth.
When command-and-control regulations set performance standards, firms
may either cut their production to meet the standard or retrofit their facilities to
abate their emissions.3" When they retrofit, the costs associated with the retrofit
are passed on to consumers .3 9 Firms that find it more difficult to abate (usually
Department of Energy, as expecting carbon capture and sequestration to be used within eight
years).
37. There are additional efficiency-related reasons policymnakers may avoid the use of
design standards as well. Efficiency mandates that abatement be achieved at the lowest cost.
Because it is the overall production of carbon dioxide emissions that are of concern, requiring
all firms to abate to the same level is inefficient. First, firms with older technology generally
have higher costs in retrofitting their production processes. See Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian
W.H. Parry, Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy 7 n.6 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished
discussion paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at
http://www.rfforg/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-07.pdf ("[It may be a lot less costly for firms
that are currently upgrading or constructing new plants to incorporate a new abatement
technology than for firms that must retrofit older plants that are not readily compatible with the
newly mandated technology."). This raises competitive concerns among firms. The costs of
abating emissions will vary from firn to firm based on the kinds of fuels used and the
engineering challenges associated with the retrofitting process. Id. Firms pay the costs of
acquiring and installing the technology and pass these costs on to consumers in higher prices.
The incidence of those costs may vary by region based on the kinds of energy resources the
region uses and the age of the energy production facilities that serve those regions. The required
level of abatement could be achieved at lower cost if firms with older technology instead pay the
firms with newer technology to abate to a higher level to cover the abatement requirements of
the older firms as well as their own abatement requirements. Second, mandating technology
removes the incentives for firms to develop new cost-effective abatement technologies. See
Fullerton, supra note 9, at 245 (noting that a command-and-control regulation that requires an
existing technology does not provide companies with an incentive to research and develop new
cost-effective technologies). Finally, design standards generate no revenues that the government
might use to offset the distributional impacts to the firms or to the consumers. See id at 225
(drawing a distinction between policies that raise revenue, such as pollution taxes, and policies
that do not raise revenue, such as command-and-control restrictions).
38. See Stavins. supra note 35. at 8 ("Performance-based standards are more flexible than
technology-based standards, specifying allowable levels of pollutant emissions or polluting
activities, but leaving the specific methods of achieving those levels up to regulated entities.").
39. Finns that find it cheaper to invest in technological retrofits (usually newer facilities)
will invest and abate only enough to reduce pollution below the cap for their facility. In making
a decision about whether to retrofit or to reduce output, firms weigh the present value of a future
gain from retrofitting against the short-term costs of the retrofit. As long as prices are higher
(because one of the effects of the cap is to limit production), firms have an incentive to make the
technological change. However, as more firns retrofit, output increases and the scarcity rents
decline. This reduces the incentive for firms to install abatement technology over time. This is
a source of inefficiency because it would be more cost-effective for firms that have installed the
technology to abate to the extent made possible by the abatement technology and for firms that
do not find it cost-effective to install the technology to pay the ones that do, sharing in the
aggregate costs of abatement and sharing in the benefits from the use of the technology.
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older facilities) must decide whether to spend more money to retrofit or simply
reduce output to meet their cap. When firms reduce their level of production to
meet their facilities' regulatory caps on pollution, less pollution occurs, but
fewer goods are produced and, therefore, prices rie.4 The more they reduce
output, the more consumers suffer from higher prices for the good, at least in
the short term. The profits associated with this change in prices are known as
scarcity rents because they arise from the artificially induced scarcity of the
polluting goods that results from the limits on pollution .4 1 Because the costs of
production have not increased, firms enjoy the bulk of the scarcity rents as
"windfall profits."4 While the allocation of a portion of the scarcity rents to
firms would allow the firms to recoup lost opportunities from reduction in
output and cover costs of the abatement technology, most of the scarcity rents
that firms would receive were formerly consumer surplus. In other words,
consumers generally will pay the costs associated with climate change policy
and shareholders of the energy suppliers will reap the profits from the increased
prices.4
Performance standards are inefficient because they result in higher social
costs.44 The costs of installing abatement technology vary from firm to firm,
and consumers suffer from higher prices because of reduced output by firms
that choose not to install abatement technology.45  Policymakers may avoid
40. Fullerton, supra note 9, at 232-33.
4 1. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 732 (1999) ("Scarcity rents are the market power to raise
prices above the competitive equilibrium when output and new entrants to the industry are
limited."); see also Fullerton, supra note 9, at 232 ("A scarcity rent is created because
government has restricted the amount of production and consumers place a higher value on the
remaining units of production.').
42. See Fullerton, supra note 9, at 233 ("Anybody who is handed an initial allocation of
permits is handed a private profit."). Governments sometimes impose price restrictions to
protect consumers from the price increases that result from regulation. Because prices are low,
demand exceeds supply and questions of allocation arise providing opportunities for rent-
seeking by firms, an economically wasteful activity. Id at 235. In addition, price restrictions
leave the government no revenue with which to address distributional impacts. Compliance
costs are borne by the government, unless the government charges firms fees for monitoring and
compliance, in which case those costs are passed forward to the consumer. Id. at 234-35. For
these reasons, price restrictions are generally disfavored.
43. Governments may capture a portion of the scarcity rents through ordinary corporate
taxes imposed on firm profits (which increase because of the scarcity rents received by firms)
and through taxes on shareholder dividends and capital gains. In general, however, these taxes
are not sufficient to offset the distributional impacts that households face from the price
increases.
44. Stavins, supra note 35, at 8.
45. The aggregate costs are higher because each firm must independently meet the
emissions standard. GRuBER, supra note 13, at 136-37. In contrast, permit-trading, discussed
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these additional social costs through use of market-based solutions.
Consequently, governments increasingly have turned to cap-and-trade systems
and excise taxes to achieve environmental policy goals."6
2. Cap-and-Trade System
Under a cap-and-trade regime, the government sets a national cap on
emissions and then issues permits to firms that emit pollution as part of their
energy production or manufacturing processes .4 ' The government maintains
the cap on emissions by limiting the number of permits it issues.
The cap in a cap-and-trade regime ideally would be set at levels to correct
fully for the environmental problem. This would restore the demand curve to
the point at which the benefits to society from access to the polluting good are
equal to--and offset-the costs to society from pollution generated by
producing or using that good .4  By limiting the quantity of pollution through a
below, allows firms to pay other firms to abate to a higher degree so that the abatement
requirements of both firms are met. This is more cost-effective because the firm that abates may
do so more cheaply than if each firm were trying to meet the emissions standard separately. Id.
at 137-38.
46. Note that virtually all of the proposals for federal legislation to address climate change
involve cap-and-trade systems or excise taxes on greenhouse gas or carbon dioxide emissions.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (identifying proposed legislation to address climate
change).
47. For both cap-and-trade systems and excise taxes, the controls are likely to be
implemented upstream. The regulated firms likely will be suppliers of fossil fuels, power plants,
electrical utilities, and possibly manufacturing concemns that have significant energy demands.
Fossil fuel importers will also be regulated in order to prevent "leakage." When operations are
regulated or taxed, firms shift their operations or purchases of the regulated good to jurisdictions
not subject to the regulation or taxation in order to lower costs. See Goulder & Parry, supra
note 37, at 24 (noting that leakage can occur when new regulations raise production costs, thus
causing polluting firms to relocate to other jurisdictions, and when new regulations increase the
price of goods, thus shifting consumer demand for those goods to other jurisdictions). By
placing the same financial burdens on goods and resources imported into the jurisdiction,
policymnakers prevent leakage and protect the integrity of their regulatory regime. Upstream
regulation is cheaper for the government to administer and enforce because there are fewer
entities to monitor. See Metcalf (2008), supra note 24, at 9-10 (describing the concept of point-
of-taxation, and noting that applying a tax at an upstream point mninimrizes the administrative
cost to the government).
48. See GRUBER, supra note 13, at 136-38 (suggesting that optimal pollution reduction
occurs where, for each polluter, "the marginal cost of reducing pollution is set equal to the
social marginal benefit of that reduction"); see also Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of
Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT'L TAx J. 513, 523-25 (1996)
(arguing that the optimal level of an environmental tax would be just enough to procure the
desired public good).
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cap, production of the polluting good is reduced so that the social cost of
pollution from using or manufacturing the polluting good equals the social
value from making the supply of the polluting good available .49 Firms may
emit pollution up to the level specified under the firm's permits, and permits
may be sold or transferred. To the extent that the costs associated with abating
pollution are lower than the value of their permits, firms are incentivized to
abate their emissions and sell their permits to other firms. Firms may finance
their retrofits and cover the costs associated with shifting to alternate energy
resources by selling their excess permits. The firms that find it more expensive
to make these alterations to meet the caps instead may purchase additional
permits and continue to operate at their existing levels of emissions. This
exchange reduces the total costs of abatement and allows firms to share costs,
imiproving efficiency.
The cap on emissions will limit the amount of output of the polluting
good. As with command-and-control performance standards, when output is
limited, prices rise, generating scarcity rents.50 The way the government
allocates the permits to the firms determines who enjoys the benefit of the
scarcity rents and therefore the incidence.51 If the government grants the
permits to firms for free, "grandfathered permits," firms will enjoy additional
profits from scarcity rents because the firms will have experienced no
additional costs of production. 2 When the firms receive the scarcity rents, the
benefits may be passed back to the owners of capital in the form of higher
profits or back to labor in the form of higher wages, or they may be passed
forward to consumers as lower prices.5
Unless regulation requires otherwise, firms may pass these windfall profits
back to shareholders.5 While the burden of a tax falls on the party that has the
49. Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. Supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
5 1. Fullerton, supra note 9, at 23. This Article does not consider the impacts of taxation
of emissions permits. These issues are examined in Ethan Yale, Taxing Cap-and-Trade
Environmental Regulation, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 535-37 (2008), and Mitchell Kane,
Taxation and Global Cap-and-Trade (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/colloquia/taxpolicy/ECM_
PRO_0615 10.
52. Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 25, at 14-15.
53. See id at 15-16 (discussing the various levels of rents companies will be able to
appropriate given different elasticity of demand).
54. Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 213 (noting that households with high income and
stock holdings will see an increase in income due to cap and trade regulation); Parry, supra note
24, at 365 ("Grandfathered pemts. .. create windfall gains for shareholders."); Burtraw
(2008), supra note 24, at 47 ("The value of emissions allowances accrue to the firm.").
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least elasticity, the party with the greatest elasticity will reap the benefits of a
subsidy or scarcity rents. 55 Again, because capital generally is assumed to be
the most elastic factor, the shareholders of firms holding emissions permits
ultimately will benefit.56  Given that shareholders are disproportionately
represented in the upper income brackets, this policy would be very regressive
and would result in a large-scale transfer of former consumer surplus to the
wealthy. 57
In contrast, the value of the permits will be passed through to consumers
in regions in which utilities are regulated under cost-of-service requirements.5
This changes the incidence; in this situation it is consumers, rather than
shareholders, who will benefit from the free allocation of permits. Consumers
in regulated areas will experience, in general, lower electricity prices than
consumers in regions that are not regulated. Unfortunately, this also
undermines their incentive to conserve energy, undercutting the goal of the
regulation.5 Consequently, in order to ensure that the required overall cap will
be met, policymnakers will need to increase the national permit price so that
consumers in other regions will reduce consumption sufficiently to counteract
the overconsumption in the cost-of-service regulated regions.6
55. See Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 25, at 15-16 (discussing the effects of elasticity
on distributions of economic rents).
56. See Fullerton, supra note 9, at 233 ("Anybody who is handed an initial allocation of
permits is handed a private profit."); Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 213 (noting that
households with high income and stock holdings will see an increase in income due to cap and
trade regulation); Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 47 ("T'he value of emissions allowances
accrue to the firm."); Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 25, at 14 (discussing the rent and extra
profit for a firm associated with grandfathered in permits). Note, however, that utility
companies governed by regulations with cost-of-service requirements would be required to pass
through the benefit of grandfathered permits and the scarcity rents to consumers, changing the
incidence.
57. Parry, supra note 24, at 380-81.
58. See Burtraw (2008). supra note 24. at 52 ("[E]lectricity consumers in regions of the
country with cost-of-service regulations do not see their prices rise as much."); Anthony Paul,
Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Compensation for Electricity Consumers Under a U.S. C02
Emissions Cap 25 (July 2008) (unpublished discussion paper, on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review), available at http://www.rfforg/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-25.pdf
("Allocation to local distribution companies based on population could yield electricity prices in
2020 for populous regions with relatively clean sources of electricity generation that are actually
below prices in the absence of climate policy.").
59. See Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 52 (noting that ramifications are high when low
consumer prices prevent electricity supplies from reducing pollution due to the same or
increased demand); Paul et al., supra note 58, at 24 ("The subsidy to electricity consumption has
the effect of reducing the incentive for consumers to make investments in end-use efficiency.").
60. Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 43 ("As a consequence of the fact that consumers do
not see higher prices, the amount of reduction necessary elsewhere in the economy goes up.");
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Even under a free allocation of emissions permits, the government may
capture a portion of the scarcity rents from firms through income taxes on
corporate profits, shareholder dividends, and capital gains.6 '1 However, the
portion the government captures would be significantly smaller than if the firms
purchased the permits at auction because the highest federal marginal corporate
tax rate is thirty-five percent. These profits also would be taxed at the state and
local levels. 62 While federal, state, and local governments in aggregate may
recover as much as forty-five percent of the value of the permits, fifty-five
percent of the profits will be retained by shareholders of energy suppliers.6
The tax revenues on corporate profits, shareholder dividends, and capital gains
are not likely to be sufficient to offset the distributional impacts of the system. 6
While allocation of some portion of the permits for free may be politically
necessary, very few free permits would be required to mitigate the short-term
transitional costs to the oil, gas, and other fossil-fuel energy industries.6
If, in contrast, the permits are sold at auction, rather than being granted for
free, firms seeking emissions permits will be required to pay the auction price
of the permits. Consequently, the government will capture any scarcity rents
that arise from the cap on pollution and may use those funds to address the
distributional impacts of the cap-and-trade regime.
3. Excise Tax on Greenhouse Gases/Carbon Tax
An alternate method for internalizing negative externalities is to place a
price on the harm caused to society from pollution and to add that sum to the
price of the polluting goods by imposing an excise tax. 6 Under this
mechanism-a "Pigouvian tax"'67-each unit of pollution is taxed at a rate that
Paul et al., supra note 58, at 24 ("If electricity price rises less due to free allocation to electricity
consumers then those consumers will have less incentive to purchase efficient air conditioners,
refrigerators, etc., causing other sectors to do more work to achieve overall emission
reductions.").
61. Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 204.
62. Id.
63. Id; CBO, supra note 24, at 12-13.
64. See Parry, supra note 24, at 379-80 (stating that the government would need to
capture "80% of the permit rents to prevent the policy from being strongly regressive").
65. See Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 25, at 39 (stating that "only a very small
fraction of the potential rents associated with C02 policies need to be earmarked for the fossil-
fuel industries to preserve profits and equity values").
66. See VARiAN, supra note 19, at 6 13-14 (discussing the use of a tax on externalities to
internalize the cost of pollution).
67. Pigouvian taxes are named for Arthur Pigou, the English economist who first
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would increase the price of the polluting good to include the social cost, and the
demand curve is shifted to the optimal quantity of polluting goods (and
pollution) .68 When the tax is included in the cost to the consumer, the price of
the good increases, fewer goods are purchased, demand falls, production slows
to meet the lower demand, and pollution falls to a level in which the harm from
the pollution is equal to the social benefits associated with the availability and
consumption of the polluting good.6 In general, an excise tax will yield similar
benefits to a cap-and-trade system with auctioned pernits in terms of
70
effectiveness, efficiency and availability of revenues. Une renhouse gas
suggested such taxes in his influential book, The Economics of Welfare. See ARTHURC. PIGOU,
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1950) (discussing the use of taxes to internalize
externalities).
68. See GRUBER, supra note 13, at 137 ("Pigouvian taxes cause efficient production by
raising the cost of input by the size of its external damage, thereby raising private marginal costs
to social marginal costs.").
6 9. Id
70. See id. at 243-45 (discussing the economic consequences of an excise tax). The
differences between the two systems, assuming no modifications to those systems, depend on
whether uncertainty in the cost of regulation (and the price of permits) or uncertainty in the
quantity of emissions (and the degree of environmental improvement) is preferable. Taxes
provide certainty as to the price increase that will arise from regulation, but do not provide
certainty that environmental improvement will occur. See id. at 74 (noting difficulties with
these taxes). The firms that find it easier to abate do so and pay fewer taxes; the firms that find
it more difficult to abate simply pay more taxes. If the tax is too low or the elasticity of demand
is low, a tax may not reduce pollution by any significant degree. A cap-and-trade regime
provides certainty as to the quantity of emissions that will be produced, but the extent of the
price increase is uncertain and will depend on the elasticity of demand. If the elasticity of
demand is high, the price increase in electricity, fuels, and goods will be low. If the elasticity of
demand is low, the price increase will be high. In general, environmentalists will be more
inclined to favor a cap-and-trade regime because they want to be certain that emissions will be
reduced. Once the level of the tax is set, the firm has some certainty about the price increase
that will occur. Theoretically, firms will prefer a tax to a cap-and-trade system because it
provides certainty as to the cost. However, there are a number of ways in which both excise tax
and cap-and-trade systems may be modified to address concerns about uncertainty in the price
of regulation and the degree of environmental improvement. A cap-and-trade system may
include systems to stabilize the permit price, such as provisions for banking and borrowing
permits, a permit reserve, and a "safety-valve" provision that allows governments to issue more
permits if the permit price rises sharply. See Henry D. Jacoby & A. Denny Ellerman, The Safety
Valve and Climate Policy, 32 ENERGY POL'Y 481, 481-84 (2004) (discussing the various forms
and functions of a safety valve and the effectiveness of each in preventing exorbitant cost
increases); Brian C. Murray, Richard G. Newell & William A. Pizer, Balancing Cost and
Emissions Certainty 3 (July 2008) (unpublished discussion paper, on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-24.pdf
(discussing one means of stabilizing a cap-and-trade system at the outset of implementation).
Similarly, the government may include in the legislation provisions to retire permits over time to
address a lack of environmental improvement. See CR0. supra note 24, at 8-14 (discussing the
permit system in general). For an excise tax, the level of the tax may be adjusted upward or
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tax, the government captures lost consumer and producer surplus as tax revenue
and may use those revenues to offset the distributional impacts of the tax.
In sum, either a cap-and-trade system with auctioned emissions permits or
an excise tax imposed on greenhouse gases will best internalize the negative
externality in a cost-effective manner and provide revenues to offset the
distributional impacts.7
C Incidence Under Both a Cap-and-Trade Regime and an Excise Tax
In general, under both a cap-and-trade system and an excise tax, high-
income taxpayers bear a larger portion of the burden in terms of dollars paid,
but low-income taxpayers bear a greater burden in terms of the incidence as a
percentage of income .7 2 The sections below discuss the incidence under a cap-
downward, or the legislation may include an automatic adjustment based on achievement of or
failure to achieve certain environmental goals. Fullerton, supra note 9, at 244-45; see also
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity
Regulation, 4 Am. LAW & ECON. REv. 1, 10-12 (2002) (providing an example where the tax
could be announced on a periodic basis and continually adjusted to reach optimal levels of
pollution). Whether it is reasonable to believe that Congress will be able to muster the
legislative will to increase the tax over time if it should be set too low is another question. See
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1153, 1179-89 (2009) (suggesting that fragmentation
of the lawmaking authority at the state and national level, short-term election cycles, and
lawmakers' dependence on large donations tend to undercut Congress's ability to set long-term
policy and tend to derail legislation over time).
7 1. Issues of political economy may be determinative, however. The scarcity rents
associated with a cap-and-trade regime will far exceed the actual costs associated with reducing
pollution. See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 213 (noting that households with high income
and stock holdings will see an increase in income due to cap and trade regulation); Parry, supra
note 24, at 365 ("Grandfathered pemts ... create windfall gains for shareholders."); Burtraw
(2008), supra note 24, at 47 ("The value of emissions allowances accrue to the firm.");
Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 25, at 15 ("[T]his rent can be quite large and, indeed, can
imply substantial increases in profits and equity values to the regulated industries.").
Consequently, this invites many firms to seek an advantage by lobbying to capture some share
of those rents. With an excise tax there is less opportunity for firms to engage in rent-seeking
behavior. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 46 (discussing the opposition to carbon
tax and why firms prefer cap-and-trade). For this reason, an excise tax might be preferred.
However, because the American public has a general aversion to taxation, a cap-and-trade
system may be a more attractive solution because the distributional costs are not as transparent
as with an excise tax, though, as discussed below, the distributional impacts will be the same if
the tax and the caps are set at levels to correct fully the harms caused by climate change. See
Paul et al., supra note 58, at 24-25 (discussing the importance of lessening the impact upon
consumers and the different ways to achieve this).
72. See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 203, 213 (noting that the lowest income group
suffers the greatest when firms are grandfathered in or when taxes collected are used to reduce
corporation income taxation); Parry, supra note 24, at 365 (discussing the regressive nature of
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and-trade system with auctioned permits and an excise tax levied either on
greenhouse gases or carbon dioxide emissions, 73 based on a number of
economic studies performed from 1994 through 2009.~ The incidence is
tracked by income and by region. To determine the distributional impacts for a
cap-and-trade system or a greenhouse gas tax actually passed by Congress,
policymnakers would need to model the incidence based on the actual cap set or
the tax imposed in the climate change legislation.7
such schemes).
73. Some models include taxes on carbon or carbon dioxide rather than greenhouse gases
generally because carbon dioxide is the most significant greenhouse gas in terms of production.
Note that each cap-and-trade model includes different assumptions about the baseline year of
emissions, the percentage reduction of emissions, the emissions price, and the year for which
that price is taken. Similarly, each carbon or greenhouse-gas tax model includes different
assumptions about the baseline year of emissions, the percentage reduction of emissions, the
amount of the greenhouse gas or carbon tax, the year for which that tax is paid, and the
consumption model. Different consumption models will result in data that distribute the
incidence among income classes differently. Each consumption model involves an estimate of
the way the tax will increase the price of gas, fuel, electricity, and the prices in consumer goods
(the "imbedded carbon" or the greenhouse gas load that each form of consumer good bears).
Each model also involves an interpretation of data from consumer surveys performed by the
U.S. Census Bureau with respect to the kind and extent of consumption likely to occur at each
level of the income distribution. For example, Dinan and Rogers merged household sample data
from the Current Population Survey, which includes more detailed information on income and
taxes from the tax-return data in the Statistics of Income, with the Consumer Expenditure
Survey, which does not contain consumption information for the highest income households.
See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 208 (discussing the econometric methodology used in
the study).
74. More studies of the incidence of excise taxes than of cap-and-trade systems have been
performed. In general, cap-and-trade systems have become popular only in recent years
following the success of the cap-and-trade system for sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide
established in 1994 to curb acid rain production.
75. Note that the assumptions for each study, in particular the baseline emissions and the
stringency of the reduction, will have a significant effect on the burdens that households will
bear. Because aggregate greenhouse gases have increased significantly in the past thirty years,
more recent baselines have significantly higher current emissions. See Metcalf (2007), supra
note 24, at 5 (stating that the rate of warming has been accelerating over the past thirty years).
Therefore, if dangerous increases in global temperatures are to be avoided, reductions required
from more recent baselines must be greater than the reductions required from earlier baselines.
According to Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, to limit the
temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, developed countries
would need to reduce emissions 10-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and approximately 40-
95% by 2050. Sujata Gupta et al., Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements, in
CLRmAT CHAN.GE 2007: MITIGATION 745, 748 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007). Emissions in
developing countries also would need to decrease by 2020, with emissions from all countries
substantially below their current trajectories by 2050. Id. For each of the models, the lower the
percentage reduction and the more distant the baseline year, the less representative the model
may be for what is needed today to avoid dangerous climate change. Nevertheless, even if the
models underestimate the percentage reduction in emissions required, they may represent what
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Each of the incidence models included in this Article is a partial
equilibrium analysis; the use of the scarcity rents or tax revenues have not been
taken into consideration when calculating the burden on each income decile.
Because they do not account for how revenues are spent, they provide a clearer
view of the impacts on households at the different income levels.76  This
permits policymakers to decide how to distribute revenues among income
groups.
1. By Annual Income
In general, if one assumes that household expenditures track with
household income, the burden of a greenhouse gas tax or cap-and-trade
regulation may be measured against annual income. Some economists suggest
that annual income is not a good period for measuring these impacts,7
subscribing instead to the permanent-income hypothesis first proposed by
Milton Friedman .7 8 Under the permanent-income hypothesis, lifetime income
is held to be a better measure of consumption because individuals engage in
may be politically feasible in the United States as a set of initial standards. If the caps or taxes
are set at the levels that fully internalize the costs of pollution, "first best" results are achieved in
terms of efficiency. However, policymakers may phase-in regulation because the degree and
extent of environmental harm are uncertain, because regulation may result in a distortion of the
labor markets, because the elasticity of demand is uncertain (raising concerns that a cap would
be too low or a tax too high), and because environmental benefits are difficult to quantify. In
other words, the initial levels set for a cap or a tax may not be as stringent as they should be to
correct fuilly greenhouse gas production. To phase-in regulation to permit a more gradual shift
to cleaner substitute goods and fuels, and avoid shocks to the economy, emissions standards
may be less stringent initially and tightened over time.
76. General equilibrium analyses can obscure the impacts because they report the net
effects of a policy after taking into consideration the use of the revenues in a particular manner.
Some of the economic studies included general equilibrium analyses, as well as the partial
equilibrium analyses cited in this paper. This Article does not include the data from these
general equilibrium analyses because they were based on assumptions about the use of revenues
that are not the focus of this Article. Nevertheless, because this Article uses the data from
partial equilibrium analyses, the impacts of prices for households in total dollar amounts may be
somewhat overstated. Ultimately, the revenues from climate change legislation will remain in
the economy and benefit households generally, even if those benefits are not distributed in a
way that bears any relation to the burdens of the legislation.
77. See Bull et al., supra note 24, at 148 (discussing the appropriate time fr-ame for
analysis); Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 157-5 8 (choosing to use "an adjusted lifetime measure
for consumption").
78. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV.
745, 751 (2007) (discussing the merits of accounting for the expected lifetime earnings of a
consumer); MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 20-37 (1957)
(discussing the permanent income hypothesis).
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consumption smoothing; they save or borrow in order to maintain roughly the
same level of consumption over time and they consume in anticipation of future
income from employment and bequests.7 If households engage in
consumption smoothing, incidence based on annual income would be biased
toward regressivity.8 Proponents of the permanent-income hypothesis suggest
that by measuring lifetime consumption, economists would have a better sense
of the impact of a greenhouse gas tax or cap-and-trade system on the welfare of
a household.8
The permanent-income hypothesis rests upon a number of key
assumptions, including the availability of complete markets and consistent
rational choices by households over time.8 These assumptions do not fully
hold.8 Individuals are limited in the availability of social insurance to hedge
against risks that would impact lifetime income, they cannot change their past
consumption based on new information about lifetime income, and they are
limited in their ability to borrow against future income because of adverse
selection effects and moral hazard.84 Individuals also fail to show consistent
preferences over time because of a tendency to discount future needs and
because they classify and use income differently depending on its source.8
In addition, empirical studies show that households do not smooth
consumption, but instead spend in accordance with their current income.8
79. See Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 157-59 (discussing the benefits of using a lifetime
consumption model).
80. See Kartik B. Atbreya & Devin Reilly, Consumption Smoothing and the Measured
Regressivity of Consumption Taxes, 95 ECON. Q. 75, 75-78 (2009) (explaining the regressive
nature of taxes on consumption).
81. Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 157-58; see also Bull et al., supra note 24, at 150-52
(arguing the benefits of a lifetime model over an annual model). As with the annual income-
based analyses, these studies model the impact of a carbon tax on industry prices and consumer
goods prices and use consumer expenditure survey data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Expenditure Survey to calculate the burden that would accrue to each sample
household. However, these studies model lifetime consumption by taking into account
educational attainment and the life-cycle changes that they suggest would change household
consumption over time.
82. Shaviro, supra note 78, at 749.
83. Id. at 749-50.
84. Id. at 770-74.
85. Id. at 774-76.
86. Data taken from the 1987 Consumer Expenditure Survey indicates that consumption
tracks annual income. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1987
CONSUMER ExPENDITURE SuRvEy (Bulletin No. 2354) (June 1990); see also Hassctt et al., supra
note 15, at 158 ("[Clonsumption, instead of being smooth, closely tracks current income over
the lifecycle.Y); Bull et al., supra note 24, at 149 (stating that current consumption closely tracks
current income); Christopher D. Carroll, Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent
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Data taken from the 1987 Consumer Expenditure Survey indicates that
consumption tracks annual income. 8 7 An individual's energy use also appears
to track current income over her lifespan. 88 For these reasons, this Article pulls
data from studies that model incidence as a measure of annual household
income.8
9
Tables 1 through 3 below set forth the results of various economic models
addressing the incidence of a cap-and-trade regime sorted by income quintile.
Table 1 provides data from the various cap-and-trade partial equilibrium
analyses with respect to the estimated annual costs in U.S. dollars for
households within each income quintile.
Income Hypothesis, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1 (1997) (arguing that a buffer-stock model-where
people save for emergencies rather than retirement-is a better model than the life-cycle
hypothesis).
87. See Bullet al., supra note 24, at 149 (providing graph of 1987 Consumer Expenditure
Survey results). Because consumption appears to track with current income, the only reason to
use a permanent-income measure would be if the gasoline and energy use of younger or older
individuals took up a larger share of their total consumption. See id. at 150 (discussing
consumption patterns throughout life for energy and this effect on the permanent-income
model). Based on driving patterns and other consumption patterns of older and younger
individuals, this would seem unlikely. See id. at 156 (noting that the consumption of energy is
relatively flat throughout life).
88. See Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 158 ("[Elnergy consumption also shows a marked
lifetime pattern. Moreover, energy consumption, instead of being smooth, closely tracks current
income over the life cycle.").
89. In addition, use of a lifetime measure would be theoretically inconsistent with the
annual or shorter-term measures used in the tax and transfer system for redistribution. See Bull
et al., supra note 24, at 152-57 (discussing the incidence and regressivity of an energy tax and
the effects on income models). Note also that, in general, redistribution under the tax and
transfer systems are based on measurements of annual income (such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC)) or income during shorter periods (such as food stamps) based on an underlying
assumption that households cannot or do not smooth income over their lifetime. See Lily L.
Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentive: The Case
for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. Ray. 23, 53-54 (2006) (discussing the U.S. tax system
and refundable tax credits). Because the sole purpose of these incidence studies is to identify'
and offset the distributional impacts of climate change legislation, it would create additional
administrative complexity to use a different measure to address the distributional impacts of
climate change policy. I am grateful to Lily Batchelder for this last point.
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Table 1. Cap-and-Trade: Incidence in Dollars per Household
Cap-and-Trade Model (Auctioned Permits)
Quintiles 1st 2d 3d 4th 5th
2004 Parr" $106 $160 $200 $266 $406
2002 Dinan & Rogers"' $558 $729 $955 $1236 $1802
2000 Congressional
Budget Office 92  $560 $730 $960 $1240 $1800
Table 2 calculates the share of the total burden borne by each quintile as a
class. Households in the highest quintile will pay on average between 3.2 and
3.8 times the amount paid by households in the households in the lowest
quintile.
Table 2. Cap-and-Trade: Share of Total Burden for Each Quintile
Cap-and-Trade Model_____
Quintiles 1st 2d 3d 4th 5th Burden
________Ratio"
3
2004 Parry 9.3% 14.1% 17.6% 23.3% 35.7% 3.8
2002 Dinan & 10.6% 13.8% 18.1% 23.4% 34.1% 3.2
Rogers ____
2000





Table 3 provides information on the annual costs of a cap-and-trade
regime. The cost increases are equivalent to percentage decreases in after-tax
income for households within each quintile. 94 The percentage change in after-
tax income allows one to compare the extent to which relative income
differences shift because of the tax imposed.95 If lower-income groups see their
after-tax incomes decrease at a higher rate than higher-income groups, then the
90. Parry, supra note 24, at 378.
91. Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 212.
92. CBO, supra note 24, at 2 1.
93. Comparison of dollar burden on 5th quintile divided by dollar burden on 1st quintile.
94. See David Kamin, Wh'Vat is a Progressive Tax Change?: Unmasking Hidden Values in
Distributional Debates, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 241, 268-69 (2008) (evaluating different measures
of progressivity in light of various theories of distributive justice and concluding that to measure
relative income inequality, one should examine the change in after-tax income that results from
a change in tax policy).
95. See id at 269 ("If percent change in after-tax income is uniform across income groups,
then the relative differences between income groups-and the shares of total income earned-
will not have changed.").
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relative disparity between the two groups will have increased and "higher-
income groups will receive a greater share of total income."06 Table 3 also
provides a ratio of regressivity, the cost as a percentage of income to the lowest
bracket (1 st quintile) divided by the cost as a percentage of income for the
highest-bracket household (5th quintile). Households in the lowest-income
quintile will bear between 1.9 and 3.9 times the burden borne by the highest-
income quintile as a percentage of income.
Table 3. Cap-and-Trade: Burden as a Percentage Decrease in After-
Tax Household Income
Cap-and-Trade Model (Auctioned Permits)
IIncome Quintiles I1st I 2d I3d I4th I5th IRegresSiVitY97
2004 Parry" 1.3% .87% .77% .72% .65% 2.0
2002 Dinan & Rogers" I6.6% I3.7% I3.1% I2.7% I1.7% I 3.9
2000 Congressional 3.3% 2.9% 2.8% 2.7% 1.7% 1.9
Budget OfficelWo
Tables 4 through 6 below set forth the results of various economic models
addressing the incidence of a greenhouse gas tax or a carbon tax regime sorted
by income decile. Where possible, the data have been converted to show
incidence by quintile for comparison to the cap-and-trade data. Table 4
provides estimates for the annual costs in U.S. dollars of a carbon tax for each
income decile.'0 '
96. Id.
97. Comparison of burden on 1 st quintile as a percentage of household income divided by
burden on 5th quintile as a percentage of household income.
98. Calculated from Parry, supra note 24, at 378, by dividing the "initial burden" by the
"net burden" and then multiplying by "% of income." While Parry included an adjustment for
"1profit income" from stock ownership for each quintile, this Article excludes "profit income"
from the calculation because "profit income" reflects total value of stock holdings for each
quintile rather than the distribution of electricity stock ownership across households within each
quintile.
99. Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 212.
100. CBO, supra note 24, at 2 1.
101. For most of the carbon tax and the greenhouse-gas tax studies, the dollar estimates of
the financial burden for each decile were not included.
233
2467 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209 (2010)
Table 4. Carbon Tax: Incidence in Dollars by Decile'02
Income Decile 2007 Metcalf Carbon Tax'03











Table 5 calculates the share of the total burden for each decile. For
comparison purposes, it also sets forth the share of burden by quintiles.
Households in the highest quintile will pay on average 3.2 times the amount
paid by households in the lowest quintile.
102. For this and several of these analyses, the authors removed the bottom 5% of the
income distribution from the analysis. For this reason the distributional impacts will be
understated for the bottom decile. These studies will report the incidence only for the bottom
5% to 10% of income and exclude the incidence for the population with income between 0 and
5%. The rationale behind this exclusion was that for the bottom 5% of households taking the
survey, consumption exceeded 200% of reported income. See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24,
at 209 (discussing "extremely high consumption-to-income ratios for low-income households"
that are "in excess of 200[%]"). The consumption model for the Bureau of Labor Statistics's
1987 Consumer Expenditure Survey showed that for the bottom 20% of households ranked by
income, consumption as a percentage of after-tax income was 235.1%. See id. at 210 tbl.3
(listing consumption data for different income groups). Data taken from the 2004-2006
Consumer Expenditure Survey apparently yield similar results. See Burtraw (2009), supra note
24, at 7 (using the 2004-2006 Consumer Expenditure Survey to find that higher-income
households spend a smaller portion of their income on energy). These results imply that income
was understated. To the extent that these households may be earning more income than they are
reporting, this also could place them in a different income decile, but there is no indication that
this occurs more frequently for lower-income households than for higher-income households.
In fact, one study has shown the opposite trend. See Andrew Johns & Joel Slemrod, The
Distribution of Income Tax Noncompliance 2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review) (Sept. 18, 2008), available at http://www.
bus.umich.edu/otpr/DITN%/20091308.pdf (finding that the ratio of unreported income to true
income increases with income).
103. Metcalf (2007), supra note 24, at 16 tbi.4.
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Table 5. Carbon Tax: Share of Total Burden for Each Decile
and Quintile
2007 Metcalf 2007 MetcalfDeciles QuintilesCarbon Tax Carbon Tax
1st 4.0%











Table 6 provides estimates of the annual costs of a carbon tax or a
greenhouse tax as a percentage of income for each income decile. It also
provides a ratio of regressivity-the cost as a percentage of income to the
lowest bracket (1st decile) divided by the cost as a percentage of income for the
highest-bracket household (10th decile).
104. Comparison of dollar burden borne by the highest income bracket (10th decile or 5th
quintile) divided by dollar burden borne by the lowest income bracket.
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Table 6. Carbon Tax: Burden as a Percentage Decrease in After-Tax
Household Income
Deciles 2008 2007 2009 Hassett Carbon 1994
Metcalf Metcalf Tax'" Bull
GHG Carbon Carbon
'ais a' 2003 1997 1987 Tax 03
$15/ton Data Data Data $5/ton
CO, $ 14.13/ $12.33/ $8.73/ co,
ton t__n C0 Con
1st'09 3.7 3.4 3.74 4.53 4.04 3.10
2d 3.0 3.1 3.06 3.47 3.29 1.25
3d 2.3 2.4 2.36 2.99 2.64 1.10
4th 2.0 2.0 2.06 2.42 2.45 0.90
5th 1.7 1.8 1.76 1.98 1.92 0.85 1
6th 1.5 1.5 1.53 1.69 1.69 0.72
7th 1.3 1.4 1.30 1.53 1.51 0.69
8th 1.2 1.2 1.23 1.34 1.40 0.63
9th 1.0 1.1 1.01 1.14 1.19 0.56
10th 0.8 0.8 0.81 0.85 1.01 0.51
Regressivity"0o 4.6 4.25 4.62 5.33 4.00 6.07
Low-income households pay a larger portion of their income to cover the
costs associated with climate change legislation than do high-income
households."1 ' When the carbon tax is measured as a fraction of annual
income, the bottom ten percent of households in income bears between four
and six times the burden bomne by the top ten percent of households in
income.' 12
105. Metcalf (2008), supra note 24, at 35 tbl. 12.
106. Metcalf (2007), supra note 24, at 16 tblA4
107. Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 162 tbl.l1.
108. Bull et al., supra note 24, at 155 tbl.2.
109. Note that for this analysis, the authors of this greenhouse gas tax study removed the
bottom 5% of the income distribution from the analysis. Supra note 102 and accompanying
text.
110. Comparison of 1st decile as a percentage of income divided by 10th decile as a
percentage of income.
1 11. See Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 162 ("[Tlhe carbon tax is quite regressive when
measured relative to current income for all three years.").
112. See id at 162-63 (describing the differences in the carbon tax's impact on high- and
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2. By Region
Two studies investigated the distributional impacts of a carbon tax by
region.' 13 The tables below show the average burden of a carbon tax as a
percentage of income within each region.'1
Table 8: Carbon Tax: Burden as a Percentage of Household Income
2009 Hassett Carbon 2003 Data 1997 Data 1987 Data
Tax"15  $14.13/ton $12.33/ton $8.73/ton
New England 1.47 1.43 1.59
Mid-Atlantic 1.50 1.71 1.81
South Atlantic 1.62 1.98 1.90
East North Central 1.79 1.79 1.91
East South Central 1.92 1.92 2.01
West North Central 1.59 1.59 2.35
West South Central 1.84 1.84 2.11
Mountain 1.73 1.73 1.93
Pacific 1.54 1.54 1.50
The 2009 Hassett study reports that the differences in the carbon burden
between regions are modest for consumption data taken for 1987, 1997, and
2003.' 16 Differences between regions may be attributable to differences in
driving patterns and weather conditions within those regions." 7 An earlier
low-income households).
113. See id. at 165 (summarizing the study's findings about the "geographic burden" of the
carbon tax); Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 1 (stating that the study analyzed how "climate
policy" would affect different regions in the United States); Burtraw (2009), supra note 24, at I
("We analyze the effects in [eleven] regions of the country and for households. ..
114. The states in each region are as follows:
New England: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Rhode Island; Midatlantic: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; South Atlantic:
West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, District
of Columbia, Maryland, Delaware; East South Central: Kentucky, Tennessee,
Missouri, Alabama, Mississippi; East North Central: Wisconsin, Illinois,
Michigan, Indiana, Ohio; West North Central: North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa; West South Central: Texas, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, Louisiana; Mountain: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah,
Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico; Pacific: California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska,
Hawaii.
Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 165 n. 14.
115. Id. at166 tbl.4.
116. See id at 157 (stating that the study examined data from 1987, 1997, and 2003 and
found that the "regional variation is at best modest" and stating that "one could argue that a
carbon tax is distributionally neutral across regions").
117. 1d. at 165.
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study of an energy tax indicated that while the incidence of the direct portion of
the tax (attributable to fuel, gas, and electricity) varied by region, the indirect
portion of the tax (attributable to the carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
"imbedded" in goods) offset those differences.'" 8 Some regions suffer higher
electricity prices because their primary source of energy generation is carbon-
intensive, such as coal; other regions are burdened more significantly from
higher gasoline prices because of increased 1rvn.9 However, these impacts
do not coincide.120 The Burtaw study provides a more detailed breakdown of
the regional analysis by income distribution.'12' Under this study, the different
regions suffer similar levels of incidence as a whole, but low-income residents
in the Northeast, the Ohio Valley, and Florida will be more heavily impacted by
a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade regime due to home heating and electricity
Costs.121
D. Incidence Summary
In general, high-income taxpayers bear a larger portion of the burden of a
greenhouse gas tax or cap-and-trade regime in terms of dollars paid. The
highest income quintile bears between 3.2 and 3.8 times the burden borne by
the lowest income quintile. 123 However, both cap-and-trade systems and excise
taxes on greenhouse gas emissions are regressive.12 Economic analyses
generally concur that the burden of climate change legislation will fall more
118. Bullet al., supra note 24, at 157 ("Regional variation of the total cost of the [British
Thermal Unit] tax is kept low by a countervailing effect between indirect and direct costs.").
119. CAD STONE & HANNAH SHAw, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICYftPRITEs, EXTENDING
"CLIMATE REBATES" TO INCLUDE MIDDLE-INCOME CONSUMERS 6 (2009), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/2- 19-09climate2.pdf.
120. See id. ("[R]egions with high gasoline consumption are not necessarily the same as
those with high utility bills, and a substantial percentage of the impact is through indirect effects
that are likely to be fairly similar across regions.").
121. See Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 1 (reporting that the study analyzed data from
different regions and household incomes); Burtraw (2009), supra note 24, at 1 (stating that the
study analyzed eleven regions in the United States and "households sorted into annual income
deciles").
122. See Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at ii (reporting that "[flow income households in
the Northeast, Ohio Valley, and Florida are consistently among the most harmed"); Burtraw
(2009), supra note 24, at 24 ("The average net consumer surplus loss, across all regions of the
country, is 0.23[%] ... and only varies by region from about 0[%] to 0.4[%].").
123. See supra Part BI.C.lI (reporting that the burden ratio of the highest income quintile to
lowest income quintile is between 3.2 and 3.8).
124. See Metcalf (2007), supra note 24, at 28 (stating that a common argument against
"carbon change" is that such policies are regressive).
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heavily on the poor than the wealthy.125 For a greenhouse gas or a carbon tax
the bottom ten percent of households in income bears approximately four to six
times the burden borne by the top ten percent of households in income as a
percentage of household income.'12 6 For a cap-and-trade system, the bottom
twenty percent of households in income bears approximately two to four times
the burden borne by the top twenty percent of households in income.'12 7 The
Congressional Budget Office has estimated that because low- and moderate-
income households consume more of their income and spend a larger share of
their budgets on energy than higher-income households, they will bear a
heavier burden from price increases resulting from any carbon tax or trading
system.'12 8 Low-income households are also less likely to be able to shift their
consumption patterns because they are more likely to rent their homes and
generally do not have the property rights or the financial incentives to
weatherize or install energy efficient appliances. The Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities estimates that the households in the lowest income quintile will
face approximately $700 per year in increased costs from climate change
legislation that reduces emissions by fifteen percent below projected levels .1
29
They anticipate that this sum will increase over time as the emissions standards
become stricter and emission caps are lowered. 130 While regional differences in
the burdens of climate change legislation may not be significant over the entire
income distribution, low-income households in Florida, the Ohio Valley, and
125. See C130, supra note 24, at viii (stating that the "increases would be regressive" and
"they would place a relatively greater burden on lower-income households than on higher-
income households"); Hassett et al., supra note 15, at 163-65 (indicating that while an annual
income measure is most regressive when current consumption or lifetime-corrected consumption
measures are used, the carbon tax is still regressive).
126. See supra Part II.C. 1 (reporting the regressivity of the carbon tax).
127. See supra Part II.C. 1 (calculating the regressivity of the cap-and-trade system). Note
that, as a theoretical matter, these numbers are consistent. Theoretically, there would be no
difference in distributional impacts between a tax and a cap-and-trade system for any given
pollutant so long as the tax and cap are set at levels designed to internalize completely the
externality. See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 90 (8th ed. 2008)
("Emissions fees and cap-and-trade systems are symmetrical policies. ... for every emissions
fee, in theory there is a cap-and-trade system that achieves the same outcome, and vice versa.").
128. See C130, supra note 24, at viii (reporting that the carbon tax or trading system would
be regressive because "lower-income households generally consume a larger share of their
income than higher-income households" and "a greater percentage of their income is spent on
energy products").
129. ROBERT GREENSTEIN, SHARON PARROTT & ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON BuDGET &
POLICY PIORrTIES, DESIGNING CLIMATE-CHANGE LEGISLATION THAT SHiELDS LOW-INCOME
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the Northeast will suffer disproportionate impacts as a result of increased home
heating and electricity costs."' 1
MI. Use of Revenues or Rents to Correct Distributional Impacts
Of the various proposals for use of climate change revenues, two
dominate: (1) an equal rebate proposal'312 grounded in concerns for equity, and
(2) a proposal to return the revenues to consumers through an adjustment to the
income tax and labor tax rates133 to maximize efficiency. To evaluate the best
way to structure a benefit to address the distributional impacts of climate
change legislation one first must be clear about the objectives. This section
outlines the theoretical underpinnings for the two main proposals, examines
their shortcomings, and then, in view of those shortcomings, proposes an
alternative solution for the use of climate change revenues: Distributional
neutrality with respect to the financial burdens that arise from climate change
policy.
A. Policy Goals
1. Consideration of Equiy. Equal Rebate
One proposal set forth in the economic literature provides for the
distribution of an equal lump sum rebate to all households, an "equal rebate."1
34
13 1. Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at ii.
132. See Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 25, at 20-24 (reviewing "several mechanisms
for achieving equity-value neutrality"); Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 211-15 (discussing
the effects of different carbon allowance trading proposals on household expenditures in the
United States); CBO, supra note 24, at 20-27 (detailing possible plans for redistributing the
revenues from carbon-allowance trading); Parry, supra note 24, at 382-85 (reporting the effects
of different environmental policies on "social welfare"); Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 27-
31 (assessing "different approaches to the distribution" of revenue raised from carbon dioxide
emissions); Burtraw (2009), supra note 24. at 13-16 (evaluating the effects of a plan to "return
C02 to households on a per capita basis").
133. See Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 31-35 (discussing the effects of different
proposals to reduce taxes); Burtraw (2009), supra note 24, at 16-19 (detailing different plans to
reduce income and payroll taxes).
134. See Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 25, at 20-24 (explaining a plan to distribute
climate change policy revenue through a "lump-sum payment"); Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24,
at 211-15 (reporting on the effects of different "lump-sum rebate" plans on "average household
costs"); CBO, supra note 24, at 20-27 (describing a plan in which revenue is used to provide
"lump-sum rebates to all households"); Parry. supra note 24. at 382-85 (analyzing the "social
costs" of a lump-sum proposal); Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 27-31 (evaluating the effects
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Under an equal rebate proposal, also known as "cap-and-dividend," all
households would receive the same rebate. 135 Households that consume at the
level of the average household at the fiftieth percentile of income would have
the impacts of the tax or cap-and-trade regime fully offset. 316 Households that
consume less would receive a rebate in excess of their burden.13 7 House holds
that consume more would not have the burden completely offset.138 While on
aggregate, the equal rebate would fully offset the financial impacts of the
greenhouse gas tax or cap-and-trade regime, lower-income households would
have a net gain and higher-income households would have a net loss following
delivery of the equal rebate.
The equal rebate proposal has some support within the scientific' 39 and the
public interest140 communities, though the philosophical underpinnings may
differ. There appear to be two theories of justice supporting this proposal.
First, Utilitarians and other proponents for the maximization of social welfare
suggest that the social welfare losses should be weighted between low-income
of the lump-sumn plan on different income levels); Burtraw (2009), supra note 24, at 13-16
(describing the effects of a lump-sum proposal on different regions and income levels).
135. Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 211-15.
136. See CBO, supra note 24, at 23 ("[T~he government could compensate all of the
households in the first four quintiles and approximately 45[%] of households in the highest
quintile for their policy-induced costs.').
137. See id. at 21 ("Average household income in the lowest quintile would increase
because those households' lump-sum rebates would be larger than their cost increases as a result
of the policy.").
138. See id (stating that the policy would result in a 'decline in average real income" for
"households in the top quintile").
139. See Shoibal Chakravarty et al., Sharing Global C02 Emissions Among One Billion
High Emitters, 106 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. U.S. 11884, 11884 (2009) (stating that per capita
emissions is acknowledged to be the only equitable goal). This group, headed by Stephen W.
Pacala and Robert Socolow, suggests an intermediate compromise that would require each
nation to cut emissions that exceed a cap equal to the nation's population times an individual
emissions cap, estimated as the emissions from consumption associated with an income of
$39,000 in U.S. dollars. Id. Conceptually, this is equivalent to setting a national cap and then
delivering a rebate to each taxpayer designed to offset the consumption associated with $39,000
of income. However, the scheme does not specify' how countries would meet their emissions
reduction goals. See also Stephen W. Pacala, Equitable Solutions to Greenhouse Warming: On
the Distribution of Wealth, Emissions and Responsibility Within and Between Nations (Nov.
14-15, 2007), available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUJB/podcast/ l6pacala.html.
140. See Why We Need Cap and Dividend, http://www.capanddividend.org/?q=readfirst/
whycapanddividend (last visited Feb. 9, 2010) (discussing the need for a cap-and-dividend
policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Proponents argue that, in any
system that divides the commons into private property, all should have equal portions. Cap and
Dividend vs. Tax and Refund, http://www.capanddividend.org/?q==readfirst/versus (last visited
Feb. 9, 20 10) ("The advantage of per capita dividends is that they cover everyone equally.") (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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and high-income households based on declining marginal utility.' 4' The
equal rebate proposal is intended to correct for the general regressivity of the
greenhouse gas tax and the cap-and-trade system.142 According to the theory
of declining marginal utility, the magnitude of social welfare loss from the
loss of a dollar is greater for low-income households than for high-income
households.14 1 Conversely, the magnitude of social welfare gain from the
receipt of a dollar is also greater for low-income households than for high-
income households.'"4 When taken to its logical conclusion, redistribution of
climate change revenues based on declining marginal utility would continue
until all households received an equal rebate.14 5  An equal rebate
overcompensates low-income households for the impacts they bear from
climate change policy and under-compensates high-income households for
the impacts they bear, essentially redistributing income from higher-income
households to lower-income households. 146
The equal rebate proposal is criticized because it fails to take into
account the existing distribution of income and wealth.147 Allocating permit
141. See Parry, supra note 24, at 382 tbl.5, 384 tbl.6 (calculating the net burden from an
emissions trading regime to the bottom income quintile and the top income quintile of
households based on the form of regulation and the mitigation scheme and applying different
distributive weights to these impacts based on income).
142. See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 24, at 219 ("If the government sought to offset the
regressivity of the policy-induced price increases by providing lump-sum rebates, lower-income
households would be better off.. .. ")
143. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstemn, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated
on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 72-73 (2009) (explaining the theory that people
with lower incomes have higher marginal utility per dollar).
144. See id. ("[U]nder the theory that poor people have the highest marginal utility for a
dollar, helping poor people will maximize global welfare.").
145. The equal rebate breaks down into two parts. First, households are restored to
roughly the place they were before imposition of climate change legislation through a corrective
payment based on consumption for their decile. Second, households above the national mean
income receive an additional tax and households below the national mean receive an additional
subsidy. For those above the national mean, households are taxed with a rate that rises as
household income increases until the prior subsidy plus the tax matches the equal rebate.
Households below the national mean receive an additional subsidy that increases as household
income declines until the corrective payment plus the additional subsidy match the equal rebate.
See Kaplow, supra note 48, at 523-24 (illustrating tax effects by breaking down the tax into two
components).
146. See id. at 524 ("[W]hen there is a change in the distortionary cost of taxation, there
also will be a countervailing change in the extent of redistribution.")
147. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 143, at 73 (explaining that the per capita approach
is often criticized because it presumes a correlation between population and wealth when
actually "there is no statistically significant correlation between population and per capita
GDP").
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revenues on a per capita basis will allocate the same value to the wealthy as
the poor, frustrating at least some of the welfarist's redistributive goals.148 if
the goal is to maximize social welfare through redistribution, then
policymakers must identify the optimal distribution of resources and make
some account of the existing distribution of income and wealth within the
population to determine how much, if any, should be reallocated. 44' This
necessarily would enmesh climate change policy in debates about
redistribution. Concerns about redistribution are generally grounded in
notions of "everyday libertarianism, "' 5 the belief that each person should be
entitled to the benefits of his labor and that taxation or other methods of
redistribution must be specifically justified.'15 1 While political philosophers
have questioned the assumptions underlying this position,15 2 everyday
libertarianism remains a strong ideological force within the United States,1
53
and any allocation of climate change revenues that redistributes income from
high-income to low-income individuals will likely face significant political
resistance.
148. See id. at 73 (concluding that the per capita approach is a "crude and even arbitrary
way to redistribute wealth" in comparison to the "pure redistributive approach, which gives few
or no permits to rich states and all or most of the permits to poor states, regardless ofpopulation
size").
149. See id. at 75 (contrasting the redistributive effects of the per capita approach with the
general principles of redistributive policy). Note that this critique is not dispositive. From the
welfarist perspective, even if greater redistribution would be preferred, granting equal rebates to
low-income households still would be an improvement over the existing allocation. See id.
(explaining that "as a matter of actual practice, these defects are not necessarily fatal to the per
capita approach" because it is possible to argue that it nonetheless is "superior to a system that is
the most likely alternative").
150. See LiAm MuRPHY & THOmAs NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAxEs AND JUSTICE
31-37 (2002) (arguing that opposition to tax-based redistribution of wealth is often based on a
false sense of entitlement to the entirety of one's own pre-tax income).
151. See id at 35-36 (explaining that everyday libertarianism is "a muted version" of
libertarianism based on "the confused idea that net income is what we are left with after the
government has taken away what really belongs to us"). See generally ROBERT NozicK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 151 (1974) ("If the world were wholly just .... [t]he complete
principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled
to the holdings they possess under the distribution."); id. at 230 ("According to the entitlement
conception ofjustice in holdings that we have presented .... [i]f the set of holdings is properly
generated, there is no argument for a more extensive state based upon distributive justice.").
152. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 150, at 31-37 (noting that everyday libertarianism
fails to take into account the many ways in which property rights are not "natural rights" but
instead exist only by virtue of state structures).
153. See id. at 31 (asserting that everyday libertarianism "infects much everyday thinking
about tax policy" and "has great political significance").
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Second, equal-rebate advocates argue that the atmosphere is a global
commons and that equity demands that climate change revenues be
distributed to individuals on an equal basis. 154 This proposal is grounded in an
egalitarian theory ofjustice 55 that is concerned with equality of resources. 
1 6
154. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 143, at 8 1-82 ("The atmosphere ... is common
property, belonging to everyone in the world. A climate treaty would close this commons,
converting it into private property. It is only fair to distribute the parcels of property to the
former users of the commons, namely, everyone in the world.").
155. There are two different kinds of egalitarianism that may apply: one that is concerned
for equality of opportunity, and another that is concerned with equality of resources. In general,
within the United States, questions of equal opportunity are inapposite because all residents
historically have benefitted from externalizing greenhouse gas emissions, and because regional
differences in development opportunities within the country are insignificant. See Hassett et al.,
supra note 15, at 157 (finding that within the United States "variation across regions is
sufficiently small that one could argue that a carbon tax is distributionally neutral across
regions"). Concerns about opportunity equality are important in the debate about allocation of
emissions rights at the international level, however, where developing nations-such as China,
Brazil, and India-are concerned that climate change regulation will slow their pace of
development. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 143, at 5 3-54 ("If that status quo is the
baseline for allocating emissions rights, poor nations are likely to have great difficulty in
achieving the levels of development already attained by wealthy nations."). Underdeveloped
countries argue for an equal opportunity to achieve the same level of development as the
Western world has through use of coal and other fossil fuel-based systems while externalizing
the social costs of pollution by carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to all countries. See
id. (explaining that "[tihose concerned about the welfare of developing nations are especially
interested in per capita allocations of emissions rights" to avoid allowing "existing distributions
of wealth, insofar as they are reflected in current emissions, [to] form the foundation for climate
change policy"). However, because development and population are not necessarily correlated,
per capita allocation of emissions may not address this problem. See id. at 55 (explaining that
many critics of per capita allocations argue that "per capita allocations will help some rich
nations and hurt some poor ones" because "there is no correlation between population size and
wealth per capita"). Critics point out that some countries with small populations are
underdeveloped, while other countries with large populations are highly developed; therefore,
allocating emissions allowances based on population will not adequately address the problem.
See id. at 73-75 ("[T]he per capita approach is attractive to a welfarist only insofar as more
populous states tend to be poorer. Not all heavily populated states are poor, however, and not
all lightly populated states are rich."). At the international level, allocation of emissions rights
on a per capita basis is also criticized for establishing that rights will be allocated to a nation
based on its population, creating incentives for governments to spurn population-control efforts
and other matters that impact global development and resources. See id. at 76-78 (explaining
that the per capita approach would "establish that the most highly populated states would obtain
the greatest benefits from international cooperation" while "governments that adopt policies that
promote economic growth would be penalized").
156. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Jf~7at is Equality? Part 2: Equality ofResources, 10
Pi-im. & PuB. AnF. 283 (1981) (arguing that equality of resources may be achieved by auctioning
off a set of resources and allowing trades to occur to permit all to be satisfied with their final
lot). In general, the cap-and-dividend proposal resembles a Coasian solution-the government
grants property rights to private parties and allows them to trade those rights until the
equilibrium is reached and all parties are satisfied. See James K. Boyce & Matthew Riddle, Cap
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Proposals for resource egalitarianism would likely also run afoul of
corrective justice principles. The proposal to achieve equality of resources by
distributing the climate change revenues on a per capita basis within the United
States may be criticized on the ground that the wealthy pay both for the external
social costs of their own consumption and for consumption by lower-income
households.' Corrective justice would require instead that each household
pay only for the harm that it has caused the environment. 158 Within the United
States, any plan to address the distributional impacts of climate change policy
would likely require that each household receive a rebate proportionate to the
distributional impact it suffered.' 59
and Dividend How to Curb Global Warming While Protecting the Incomes of American
Families 5 (Political Econ. Research Inst. Working Paper No. 150, 2007), available at
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/workingpapers/workingjapers_101 -150/WP150.pdf
(explaining how a cap-and-dividend policy might work). By treating the atmosphere as a global
commons and dividing it up into equal shares based on global population, each human being
will have a tradable right to a share of the atmosphere. See id. ("A cap-and-dividend policy
would transform the U.S. share of the Earth's carbon-absorptive capacity from an open-access
resource into the common wealth of all Americans."). Like many Coasian solutions that involve
large numbers of participants, this scheme would be undermined by the logistical difficulties
and the substantial transaction costs associated with establishing a market at which all may trade
their rights. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 1-6 (1960)
(explaining how private bargaining can often overcome negative externalities without the need
for government intervention). A similar economic result is obtained by regulating upstream and
splitting the revenues that arise from regulation equally between all affected parties. See Boyce
& Riddle, supra, at 5 (suggesting that "Cc]arbon revenues would be most easily collected
'upstream"'); Burtraw (2009), supra note 24, at 13-15 (discussing a cap-and-dividend
proposal). Of course, this does not account for those who would not be willing to sell their
rights at any price. See Boyce & Riddle, supra, at 5-6 (explaining how a cap-and-dividend
policy might work).
157. See Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution andLabor SupplyDistortion
to Government Policy, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 170 n.8 (2004) (explaining that when
environmental regulations "hold the value of income transfers constant in real trs... the rich,
through steeper marginal income tax rates, in essence pay for both their own environmental
benefits and a share of others' benefits"); Kaplow, supra note 48, at 514, 516 (discussing the
relationship between "the optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of income
taxation").
158. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate
Change Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 377, 388 (explaining that "people
should not benefit from their own wrongdoing and should compensate those who have suffered
as a result").
159. Note that at the international level, principles of corrective justice also would pave the
way for the developed world to pay reparations for past emissions to countries likely to suffer
harm from climate change. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the United States has a duty to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions based on tort law principles that "people should not benefit from their
own wrongdoing and should compensate those who have suffered as a result"). The
anthropogenic stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere was, until recent decades, almost
exclusively the responsibility of the United States and Western Europe. See id. at 385-87
245
2667 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209 (2010)
From a libertarian perspective, rights to the commons do not belong to all
equally, but to those who acquire them first and put them to the best and
highest use. This allocation of rights to the commons has its historical
grounding in Locke's assertion that one has a right to the fruits of one's labor
and to the portions of the commons with which one has mixed one's labor.1 60
(discussing the United States' responsibility for past emissions and climate change). Recently,
China has succeeded the United States as the top emitter, though China's per capita emissions
levels are significantly lower. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 143, at 61 (explaining that
China has surpassed the United States in aggregate emissions but the United States remains well
ahead of China when emissions levels are calculated on a per capita basis). Developing
countries--such as China, Brazil, and India-have called upon the developed world to pay for
these past emissions. See Farber, supra note 158, at 380-81 (explaining that developing nations
have called for the United States to pay for past emissions). Some scholars deflect this demand
on the ground that the proposal is politically unfeasible. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note
143, at 87-91 ("[D]omestic self-interest imposes a significant limitation on what is
feasible ... nations should not be expected to sign a climate change agreement from which they
are large-scale net losers."). While within ajurisdiction a government may make decisions to
pay reparations for past harms or to distribute revenues or develop other programs to provide its
citizens some measure of equal opportunity, large-scale transfers from developed countries to
developing countries based on past emissions is unlikely to occur because there are no binding
structures at the international level to encourage this. See id. at 87 ("[Blecause treaties require
the consent of treaty partners, states must believe that by entering a treaty they are serving their
national interests."). Instead, each nation will negotiate based on its own needs and the breadth
of its power base. See id. (explaining that "[a] workable climate treaty will have to be one that
serves the interests of major industrial nations, including developing countries"). Consequently,
the developed world is unlikely to agree to large-scale transfers to developing countries in
excess of what they currently give in foreign aid. See id. at 83, 86-90 (explaining that
developed countries "are unlikely to agree to massive ... redistribution of wealth by entering a
climate treaty" because "the existing level of foreign aid is probably not greatly lower than the
amount that rich states are willing to pay in order to be altruistic"). While welfarists generally
are concerned only with making redistributive decisions based on a current time-slice and not
with the historical events that have led to the current distribution, see id. at 72-73 (explaining
the perspective and concerns of welfarists), refusal to address historic responsibility has two
important consequences. First, debates over the allocation of responsibility for the current stock
of greenhouse threaten to derail international cooperation on climate change. Second, if no
mechanism is in place to deal with past emissions or under-regulation of current emissions, the
United States and other large-scale emitters will have incentive to under-regulate and to delay
regulation. The author suggests that a nonprofit endowment fund funded by the governments of
large-scale emitters address the harm from past emissions. This would bracket the issue of past
emissions and permit climate change regulation to move forward within the United States,
avoiding the additional costs that arise from delay in regulation. See Valentina Bosetti et al.,
Delayed Action and Uncertain Targets. How Much Will Climate Policy Cost? 7-9, 13-15
(CESifo Working Paper No. 2403, 2008), available at http://www.ssmn.com/abstract--12735 10
(estimating the costs of delay).
160. See JOH-N LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690) ("Though the earh ... be common to all men, . . . every man
has a property in his own person: . .. the work of his hands ... [is] properly his. Whatsoever
then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, . ... he hath mixed his labour with,
and joined it to something that is his own .. , and thereby makes it his property.").
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Locke acknowledged, however, that the right to the commons is limited; an
individual has an exclusive right to those items pulled from the commons so
long as "enough, and as good, [is] left in common for others.," 6' Locke's
proviso is generally interpreted in two ways: the stringent interpretation, which
would not permit acquisition of common property if it resulted in another
having lost opportunities to use that property, and the weaker interpretation,
which would not permit acquisition of common property if it resulted in another
no longer being able to use the property freely when previously he could. 162
While modem libertarian theory has reserved the authority to require
compensation when the principles of justice in acquisition have been
violated, 16 3 it would require compensation only when the weaker condition is
satisfied. Justice in acquisition would require that one not worsen another's
position by removing his free access to common resources he was using
previously. 164 On the other hand, to the extent that the other person was not
using those resources, libertarians would not recognize rights or require
compensation, appealing to common justifications for private property itself:
"[Ilt increases the social product by putting the means of production in the
hands of those who may use it most efficiently (profitably."'
6 1
Finally, critics charge that the poor will never benefit from an allocation of
emissions rights (or the value of emissions permits) because the permits are not
granted to individuals directly, but to governments at the international level or
to private industries within nations. 166 A per capita allocation of emissions
16 1. Id.
162. See NOZICK, supra note 151, at 176 (discussing two possible interpretations of
Locke's proviso).
163. See id. at 178 ('Someone whose appropriation otherwise would violate the proviso
still may appropriate provided he compensates the others so that their situation is not thereby
worsened; unless he does compensate .. , his appropriation will violate the proviso of the
principle of justice in acquisition and will be an illegitimate one.'). To the extent that the
atmosphere can be acknowledged as a global commons to which all have an equal right, an
equal rebate theoretically would be justified as payment to each household for the right to use
those commons.
164. See id (asserting that 'any adequate theory of justice in acquisition' would require
that "a process normally giving rise to a permanent bequcathable property right in a previously
unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is
thereby worsened").
165. Id. at 177. Note that this position allocates greater rights to those who access
resources prior in time, without regard for issues of intergenerational equity, which are
significant concerns in the context of climate change. See infra notes 190-91 (discussing future
effects of climate change).
166. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 143, at 75 (explaining the risk that wealthy elites
controlling governments of poor nations may not support redistribution of wealth and may use
the proceeds of a permit system to increase their own wealth rather than to help the poor). As
247
248 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209 (2010)
rights can meet neither welfarist nor egalitarian goals unless the emissions
rights or the value of those rights actually reach each individual within a
country.
2 . Consideration of Efficiency (Offset of Benefits and Burdens)
A number of public finance economists support using revenues from
climate change legislation to reduce income or payroll taxes in order to improve
efficiency.167 Income and labor taxes are thought to distort an individual's
decisions about whether or not to work; by effectively reducing the value of an
individual's wages, income taxes and consumption taxes impact an individual's
choice of labor over leisure.'168 Because environmental taxes and environmental
regulation increase the price of consumption, they exacerbate this distortion,
increasing inefficiency.169 This "tax interaction effect" is believed to multiply
the efficiency costs of labor and income taxes.170 However, by using climate
change revenues to lower income and labor taxes, existing efficiency losses
from these taxes may be reduced and the tax interaction effect may be reduced
or neutralized.'17 1
These kinds of efficiency improvements are generally supported under one
theory of justice commonly known as "the difference principle," proposed by
John Rawls.172 The difference principle is concerned primarily with the welfare
discussed in Part II, supra, if the permits are grandfathered (given away to firms for free), the
poor will not benefit except to the extent that corporate taxes capture a portion of the windfall
profits. If the permits are auctioned, the government will receive all of the revenue. Whether
the poor will benefit depends on how the government allocates that revenue.
167. See Ian W.H. Parry, Roberton C. Williams & Lawrence Goulder, W"en Can Carbon
Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role ofDistorted Factor Markets, 37
J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 52, 53 (1999) ("Carbon taxes ... enjoy the revenue-recycling effect
as long as the revenues obtained are used to finance cuts in marginal tax rates of distortionary
taxes such as income tax."); see also A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder,
Environmental Taxation and Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC EcoNomics 1471, 1476-77
(2d ed. 2002) (discussing the policy implications of using revenues from environmental taxes to
finance cuts in distortionary taxes).
168. See Parryet al., supra note 167, at 53, 59--60 (discussing the interaction between taxes
and labor supply).
169. See id. at 53 (explaining the tax interaction effect).
170. See id. at 53-54 (discussing the tax interaction effect).
171. See id. (explaining the need for and effect of using revenues from a climate change
policy to reduce preexisting taxes); see also Burtraw (2009), supra note 24, at 16 n. 12
(explaining that the tax interaction effect can be partially offset by using revenues from the new
regulations to lower the marginal rates of distortionary taxes).
172. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-7 8 (Harvard University Press 1971)
(defining the difference principle).
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of the least well-off in society.173 Under this theory of justice, one would make
all adjustments that improved welfare of at least one person without making
anyone worse off. 174  In addition, one would make further adjustments to
improve the welfare of the least well-off;, however, to the extent that imposing a
regulation or tax on the most well-off ultimately could harm the least well-off in
society, one would refrain.175  Because efficiency losses impact the poor,
policies that improve efficiency, such as the use of revenues to decrease
existing labor and income tax rates, must be considered under this theory of
justice.
In general, most studies that model the use of climate change revenues to
reduce income tax and payroll tax rates are shown to be very regressive,
benefitting the wealthy. 17' These adjustments to the tax rates are thought to
over-compensate the wealthy for the impacts of climate change Policy.'717 Note,
173. See id at 75-80 (explaining that the difference principle maximizes the expectations
of those in society's least favored positions).
174. See id. at 70 ("[A]n arrangement of right[s] and duties .. . is efficient if and only if it
is impossible to change the rules. ... so as to raise the expectations of any representative man (at
least one) without at the same time lowering the expectations of some (at least one) other
representative man.').
175. See id. at 78-79 ("[S]ociety should try to avoid the region where ... difference
between rich and poor makes the latter even worse off.... "). Rawls notes that there are many
Pareto efficient allocations of wealth, including one in which a single person holds everything.
From this Rawls concludes that efficiency cannot alone serve as a principle ofjustice, and goes
on to develop the difference principle:
Now those starting out as members of the entrepreneurial class in property-owning
democracy, say, have a better prospect than those who begin in the class of
unskilled laborers. It seems likely that this will be true even when the social
injustices which now exist are removed. What, then, can possibly justify' this kind
of initial inequality in life prospects? According to the difference principle, it is
justifiable only if the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the
representative man who is worse off, in this case the representative unskilled
worker. The inequality in expectation is permissible only if lowering it would
make the working class even more worse off. Supposedly.... the greater
expectations allowed to entrepreneurs encourages them to do things which raise the
long-term prospects of the laboring class. Their better prospects act as incentives
so that the economic process is more efficient, innovation proceeds at a faster pace,
and so on. Eventually the resulting material benefits spread throughout the system
and to the least advantaged.
Id. at 78.
176. See Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 31-34 (explaining that using climate change
revenues to reduce taxes will disproportionately benefit higher-income groups); Burtraw (2009),
supra note 24, at 16-19 (same).
177. See Burtraw (2009), supra note 24, at 16-19 (explaining that tax reductions have a
regressive effect that disproportionately eliminates the burden for higher-income groups and
tails to reduce the burden on lower-income groups).
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however, that these models reduce income and labor tax rates in a way that
does not reflect the incidence of climate change Policy.178 As Louis Kaplow
demonstrates, efficiency concerns may be neutralized by adjusting income tax
rates or labor tax rates in a way that fu~lly corrects for the incidence of an
environmental tax.' 79 Nevertheless, even if adjustments to the income tax rates
or labor tax rates are perfectly calibrated to offset the incidence of a greenhouse
gas tax or cap-and-trade regime, this method will fail to address the
distributional impacts of the policy for a significant number of households. The
unemployed,18 retirees, elderly citizens supported by Social Security, and
individuals receiving social security disability insurance would be excluded
from the benefit entirely or not have the financial impacts of the policy fully
offset because these households are not currently earning income or because
their income is not currently subject to income or labor taxes. Furthermore,
few households in the lowest income decile actually pay income taxes by virtue
of their exemptions and the standard deduction. Consequently, any changes in
income tax rates would not offset the impacts of climate change policy.
Modification of the income tax and labor tax rates, far from benefitting the least
well-off, would in fact fail to address the needs of some of the most vulnerable
populations in the United States.
Furthermore, efforts to maximize efficiency require that both the benefits
and the burdens of climate change legislation be measured. As Louis Kaplow
has pointed out, none of the current models takes into account the enhancement
of social welfare and the distribution of environmental benefits that result from
environmental taxes.' 81  Distributional impacts are not estimated correctly
unless the welfare gains from improving the environment are netted against the
welfare losses associated with increased costs that arise from environmental
178. Burtraw provides a general equilibrium analysis of incidence of a cap-and-trade
regime with an income tax reduction that is proportionate to the income taxes paid by each
decile and a labor tax reduction of 2% for all deciles. Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 3 2-34.
A model designed to offset incidence would scale the income tax cut with income, not with the
income tax paid at each decile.
179. Kaplow, supra note 48, at 523-24 (describing a corrective tax scheme that "will
eliminate any effects on labor supply from both the environmental tax itself and from the effects
of that tax on environmental benefits").
180. As of December 2009, the national unemployment rate was 10.0%. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT SITUATION DECEMBER 2009 (Jan. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nrO.htnm.
181. See Kaplow, supra note 48, at 523-24 (analyzing environmental taxes in terms of
both distortionary costs and the public good); see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 143, at
70-71, 81-82 (arguing that because many populous nations have more to suffer from climate
change and therefore more to gain from its regulation, these benefits should be taken into
account when allocating rights).
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regulation.18 2  Because wealthier households are thought to enjoy
environmental benefits preferentially, utility gains from environmental
regulation are generally held to track with income. 13Consequently, the
financial impacts of environmental regulation may be largely offset by the
social welfare gains for some deciles; this will depend on the distribution of
social benefits associated with the environmental improvement. 184 In addition,
the efficiency losses from the tax interaction effect are grounded in the
assumption that marginal environmental benefits will be zero or less.'185 If, in
fact, they are greater than zero and the environmental benefits have a negative
impact on labor demand or a positive impact on labor supply, the magnitude of
the efficiency losses from the tax interaction effect will be lower.
Unfortunately, climate change poses a unique set of problems for
comparing the social costs and bcnefits of climate change policy. A number of
economists hold that there are temporal and geographic differences between the
households that will bear the burden of climate change regulation and the
households that will benefit.186  The harm from greenhouse gas emissions
results from the accumulation of greenhouse gases; it increases not
proportionately to the amount of emissions produced, but at an increasing rate
based on the amount of emissions already in the atmosphere. 187 Therefore,
182. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 143, at 81-82 ("[Cllimate effects are extremely
variable-hurting some people very badly, having no effect on others, and benefiting still
others. From the standpoint of fairness, it would be strange to ignore these harmful effects
while considering only the revenue effects.").
183. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OAThs, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONmENTAL POLicy 191-212 (Prentice Hall, Inc. 1975).
184. See Kaplow, supra note 157, at 162-63 (explaining that "benefits may have any
relationship with income, not just being constant in dollars or strictly proportional to income").
185. See Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 167, at 1494-97 (examining potential impacts
of environmental taxes).
186. See Robert Mendelsohn, Ariel Dinar & Larry Williams, The Distri butional Impact of
Climate Change on Rich and Poor Countries, I11 ENvTL. & DEv. EcoN. 159, 161 (2006) ("The
results indicate that the poorest half of the world's nations suffer the bulk of the damages from
climate change, whereas the wealthiest quarter has almost no net impacts.").
187. See generally Solomon et al., supra note 1. This is known as the stock-flow problem.
To illustrate this concept, scholars frequently use an analogy comparing the Earth's atmosphere
to a bathtub with a spigot that is much larger than its drain. While carbon dioxide and
greenhouse gases are currently flowing into the tub at a brisk rate, the drain (the ability of the
Earth's ecosystem to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere) is limited. Consequently,
even if greenhouse gas production is slowed, the level of greenhouse gases in the tub will not
fall unless the flow into the tub is slower than the drain out. Furthermore, given the existing
level in the tub (the "stock" of greenhouse gases), the flows in will need to be significantly
lower than the drain out if the level in the tub is to fall in the near future. See Lazarus, supra
note 70, at 1164-66 (using the analogy of a bathtub drain to illustrate the stock-flow
relationship).
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even if governments regulate the amount of emissions produced, the potential
for harm is not reduced unless the aggregate emissions in the atmosphere
decline.18 8 This will require stringent cutbacks in emissions today to avoid
harms that are anticipated to occur fifty or one hundred years in the future.1
89
Because many of the most significant environmental benefits that come from
reducing greenhouse gases (such as the avoidance of catastrophic harm) are
expected to occur in the distant future, economists discount the value of those
benefits.190 The higher the discount rate chosen, the smaller the estimate of the
present value of those benefits will be.'19' Because the present value of the
benefits of climate change policy is estimated to be small compared to the costs,
some economists argue for delayed action and for under-regulation.1
92
In addition, impacts will vary geographically.193 Developing countries and
countries at low-latitudes will face greater risk due to greater sensitivity and
188. See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MrIGATION,
supra note 75, at 42-43 (explaining that emissions levels will need to be reduced significantly
below current levels in order to reduce the potential for future harm).
189. See Ramanathan & Feng, supra note 1, at 14245 (observing that the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that approximately 25% of the committed
global warming has already occurred, however, "[allbout 90% or more of the rest of the
committed warmng ... will unfold during the 2 1st century"); Solomon et al., supra note 1, at
1709 ("[S]ocietal decisions regarding carbon dioxide concentrations that have already occurred
or could occur in the coming century imply irreversible dangers relating to climate change ...
pos[ing] substantial challenges to humanity in nature, with a magnitude that is directly linked to
the peak level of carbon dioxide reached.").
190. See generally David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change andDiscounting
the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y Rnv. 433, 438-49 (2009)
(outlining the debate regarding the appropriate discount rate to employ to match cash flows in
different periods, and arguing that overall savings and investment rates should be modified over
time when discounting is shown to produce indefensible or unethical results).
191. Note that this calculation does not take into account the chance of catastrophic climate
change or considerations of intergenerational equity. See id. at 436 (discussing the issue of
discounting in the context of climate change). To the extent that future generations will be
impacted, some have argued that equity requires intergenerational neutrality. See id. (noting the
argument against a discounting scheme that would violate the principle of intergenerational
neutrality by "treating the welfare of people who live in the future as far less important than the
welfare of people who live in the present"); see also REvESZ & LIVERmoRE, supra note 10, at
116-17 (discussing the application of both sustainable development principles, in which a
certain amount and certain kinds of resources are set aside for future generations, and corrective
justice principles, in which harms done by a generation must be corrected by that generation).
192. See Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 190, at 433-34 ("[Rjapid changes impose costs
that are far too large relative to the benefits, and [Nordhaus] prefers a slow but steady change in
the energy supply system. As a result, Nordhaus argues in favor of a relatively low carbon
tax.").
193. See Smith et al., supra note 1, at 4134-35 (exploring the disparity of impacts caused
by climate change and observing that "[slome regions, countries, and populations face greater
harm from climate change, whereas other regions, countries, or populations would be much less
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less capacity to adapt. 194 A number of economists conclude that the United
States will benefit from global warming and, instead, will be harmed by
climate change legislation.' 95
These assumptions about who will benefit from climate change
legislation are beginning to be called into question, however. First, the
United States already may be experiencing the adverse impacts of climate
change.196 The Western United States is subject to drought, heat waves,
forest fires, flash floods, and mudslides. 19 7  In the Southeastern United
States, hurricanes and floods are recurring events.198 Similar impacts will
continue to occur long before the risks of catastrophic loss are
immediate.199 While the United States may not be as vulnerable as some
countries because of its relative wealth and infrastructure, which allow it to
manage climate change impacts, these impacts are not expected to be
gradual, but abrupt .20 0 Specific populations-such as the elderly and the
poor-within developed countries like the United States also may show
harmed-and some may benefit").
194. Id. at 4136.
195. See Mendelsohn et al., supra note 186, at 173 ("Poor countries continue to bear the
burden of climate change damages, whereas rich countries likely benefit."); see also Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1610-i1 1(2008) (going
so far as to suggest that the countries most likely to be harmed by climate change should deliver
side-payments to the United States to offset its current costs associated with greenhouse gas
abatement).
196. See Smith et al., supra note 1, at 4 135-36 (intimating, through mentioning extreme
climate events such as Hurricane Katrina, that the United States is one of the developed
countries with higher than expected levels of vulnerability to climate change impacts).
197. KURT M. CAMPBELL ET AL., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INTL. STUDIES, THE AGE OF
CONSEQUENCES: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE 37 (2007), available at http://csis.org/publication/age-consequences (finding
that the Western United States "will experience progressively more severe and persistent
drought, heat waves, and wildfires in future decades as a result of climate change" (footnote
omitted)).
198. See Smith et al., supra note 1, at 4 135-36 (identify'ing tropical cyclones, droughts,
extreme heat waves, floods, and wildfires as examples of recent "extreme climate events" that
are expected to increase in both quantity and intensity).
199. See Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk:- Insurance
Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1561 (2008) ("If insurers do not rise to the challenge of
climate change, there could be a serious financial and social crises on a global scale."). The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates that weather and climate-sensitive
industries are responsible, directly and indirectly, for approximately one-third of the U.S. gross
domestic product. Id. at 1570 n.39.
200. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 197, at 37.
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greater sensitivity and less capacity to recover, as was demonstrated with
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.201
Scientists also predict that increased extreme weather events, coastal
flooding, health impacts, and reduction in water supplies will result in net
damage to global markets.20 Given Americans' increasing reliance on
foreign goods203 and foreign investment opportunities' 204 U.S. household
income and wealth would be subject to increased risks from climate
change. Firms throughout the United States currently are acquiring
insurance products to cover losses associated with these impacts .205
However, there is some indication that the insurance markets themselves
201. See Smith et al., supra note 1, at 4136 ("There is increasing evidence of greater
vulnerability of specific populations, such as the poor and elderly, to climate vulnerability and
change in not only developing but also developed countries. .... [and examples include] events
such as Hurricane Katrna. .. ."). Hurricane Katrina in 2005 resulted in over 3,000 deaths and
caused over $200 billion in property losses, including approximately $40 to $60 billion in
privately insured losses. RAWLE 0. KING, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., HURRICANE
KATRINA: INSURANCE LOSSES AND NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR FINANCING DISASTER RISK 4
(2005), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33086.pdf. It has cost American
taxpayers $7.9 billion to date. Shaila Dewan, Ready or Not, Katrina Victims Are Losing
Temporary Housing, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at 18.
202. See Smith et al., supra note 1, at 4136 ("[Cllimate change over the next century is
likely to adversely affect hundreds of millions of people through increased coastal
flooding ... [J] reductions in water supplies ... [J] and increased health impacts ..... )
203. See Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S.
International Trade in Goods and Services (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.bea.gov/
newsreleases/internationaltrade/2009/tradO2O9.htmn (last visited Feb. 23, 20 10) (noting that, in
February 2009, the United States imported $152.7 billion in international goods and services,
maintaining a $26 billion trade deficit) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
These large numbers come in spite of the nation's current economic recession. See MARTIN
NEIL BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTTr, BROOKINGS INST., THE U.S. FINANCIAL. AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS: WHERE DOES IT STAND AND WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 2-11 (2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/Papers/2009/0615_-economic crisis -baily elliott!
0615_economnic crisis -baily elliott.pdf (chronicling the history behind the "severe recession"
from 2007 until 2009 and discussing its causes and effects).
204. See Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxring International Portfolio Income, 56 TAx
L. REv. 537, 538 (2003) ("In most years since 1990, the total market value of U.S. persons'
foreign portfolio investments has exceeded the value of U.S. corporations' foreign direct
investments, and the total amount of U.S. taxpayers' foreign portfolio income has exceeded their
income from foreign direct investments." (footnote omitted)). "Cross-border portfolio
investments are no longer a tiny tail on a large direct-investment dog. International portfolio
investments now play a major role in the world economy, a role quite different from that played
by foreign direct investments." Id.
205. See Hecht, supra note 199, at 1561 ("[The] awareness [that climate change poses a
risk to the long-term stability of the insurance industry] has encouraged significant recent
activity among insurance companies to attempt to assess and to react to climate change.").
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are at risk from climate change.20 Finally, the ancillary benefits of climate
change legislation should also be considered. 0 Because other air
pollutants may decline when carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are
regulated, the environmental benefits from reduction of other forms of air
pollution may have a beneficial impact that should be included in the
208analysis.
To date, however, no quantification of the extent of the benefits of
climate change legislation and no study of the distribution of these benefits
within the United States have been performed. Because the extent and the
distribution of the beneficial impacts of climate change legislation are
difficult to ascertain, this method of offsetting the distributional impacts of
the legislation remains impracticable at this stage.
206. See Carolyn Kousky & Roger M. Cooke, Climate Change and Risk Management:
Challenges for Insurance, Adaptation, and Loss Estimation 6-10 (Feb. 2009) (unpublished
discussion paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RF-DP-09-03-REV.pdf(noting that insurance markets are
at risk from climate change because of global micro-correlations, fat tails, and tail dependence
and may even be subject to collapse).
207. See REvEsz & LIVERMORE, supra note 10, at 55-65 (arguing that a cost-benefit
analysis with respect to environmental regulatory decisions should acknowledge both the
collateral consequences and the ancillary benefits of the regulations).
208. See Dallas Burtraw et al., Ancillary Benefits of Reduced Air Pollution in the United
States from Moderate Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Policies in the Electricity Sector 32-35 (Dec.
2001) (unpublished discussion paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review),
available at http://www.rff.orglrfFdocuments/rff-dp-01 -61l.pdf (noting that because the facilities
that are regulated under climate change legislation will shift to cleaner energy sources, air
quality may improve from reduction of Clean Air Act criteria pollutants). But see William F.
Pedersen, Adapting Environmental Law to Global Warming Controls, 17 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J.
256, 261 (2008) (examining the problematic nature of emissions caps, and explaining that
"[s]ince 'capped' sources in the aggregate are free to emit up to the 'capped' amounts, theywill
always do so rather than incur the expense of controls"); David Schoenbrod et al., Climate
Change and Air Pollution: An Integrated Proposal, in BREAKING THE LOGJAM:
ENviRONMENTAL REFORM FOR THE NEW CONGREss AND ADMINISTRATION 12 (2009), available at
http://www.breakingthelogjam.org/CMS/files/ClimateReportvl r4.pdf ("Under the current state
implementation plan process, cuts in criteria pollutants were not exceeded."). Note that
pollution "hotspots" are expected to arise unless the caps for criteria pollutants are coordinated
with the caps for greenhouse gases. See id. at 5 ("The principal argument against reliance on a
federal cap and trade program to reduce criteria pollutants is that it could create local pollution
hotspots."). Firms subject to greenhouse controls will emit less pollution under the Clean Air
Act, but firms not subject to greenhouse controls will be allowed to emit more to meet the
national Clean Air Act cap, leaving no net difference in the amount of pollution nationwide.
See Pederson, supra, at 261 (noting the problems associated with a pollution cap approach).
Some locations may, in fact, experience worse pollution where polluting firms in their area are
not subject to the greenhouse gas limits. See Schoenbrod et al., supra, at 12 (observing that,
under certain climate control schemes, some pollution sources could "increase their criteria
pollutant emissions, so long as the cap was not exceeded").
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3. Distributional Neutrality (Proportionate Rebate)
Providing an equal rebate to all U.S. households raises political
concerns about entitlement to the commons and about redistribution that
could delay action .209 Modifying income tax or labor tax rates will not
address the economic impacts of climate change policy for the most
210vulnerable households in the United States. In addition, delivering a
rebate that accounts for the fiscal benefits and burdens of climate change
policy remains challenging. 2 1'1 Therefore, another solution is needed. One
option is to restore the households to their economic position prior to the
imposition of climate change legislation. This could be accomplished by
capturing all climate change revenues and providing a rebate that is
proportionate to the fiscal burden the greenhouse gas tax or the cap-and-
trade regime imposed-a "proportionate rebate." This policy neutralizes
the financial impacts of climate change legislation, sidesteps debates about
redistribution, and holds out the possibility of calculating the net cost of
climate change policy as more information becomes available about the
distribution of environmental benefits. While there may be efficiency
losses from the tax interaction effect, these must be balanced against the
harm that would be suffered by the most vulnerable populations if excluded
from the benefit because of age, disability, or unemployment. In addition,
the conclusion that there will be efficiency losses from the tax interaction
effect rests in part on the assumption that the marginal environmental
benefits will be zero.21 Because no studies have been performed yet that
include an estimate of the environmental benefits, these efficiency losses
may not be as significant as expected.
Under a proportionate-rebate scheme, the government would base a
household's rebate on the average consumption for the average-income
household within its income decile, and would scale the rebate according to
household size.21 Within each income decile, the households with average
209. See supra notes 146-65 and accompanying text (exploring the political and equitable
issues associated with an equal rebate scheme).
2 10. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (explaining that an equal rebate
approach allocates the same value to the wealthy as to the poor).
211. See supra notes 176-208 and accompanying text (discussing the issues associated
with offsetting the benefits and burdens of climate change policy).
212. See Parry et al., supra note 167, at 54 n.6 (observing that the "impossibility of
efficiency gains was demonstrated through numerical simulations" (citing A. Lans Bovenberg &
Lawrence H. Goulder, Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other Taxes:
General-Equilibrium Analyses, 86 Am. EcoN. REv. 985, 989-95 (1996))).
213. The system would employ the same mechanism used to scale poverty level for family
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consumption within the decile would have the burdens of the tax or cap-
and-trade regime fully offset. Households that consumed less than average
for their size and decile would be somewhat overcompensated. Households
that consumed more than average for their size and decile would be
undercompensated. This structure would provide incentives to conserve at
all levels of income. Because the rebates generally restore households
within each income decile to the income level they enjoyed before
imposition of the tax or cap-and-trade regime, there is no net loss of
income. The level of progressivity established by the income tax system
remains the same as it was before imposition of the tax.
The Obama Administration estimates that the first-year revenues for a
cap-and-trade system would generate approximately $80 billion 2 14 in gross
revenues 25annually. To illustrate how these funds would be distributed
among deciles and quintiles of the population based on the distribution of
the burden as estimated under a 2007 carbon tax model, Table 9 shows the
distribution of climate change revenues among income deciles and
quintiles. 1
size.
214. Deborah Zabarenko & Ayesha Rascoe, Obama Budget Realistic on Climate Revenue:
Analysts, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/envirornmentNews/idUSTPE
51P4Q920090226 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Obama Budget Plan Eyes Climate, Clean Energy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26,2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29416656 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
215. See CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BuDGET &PouicvPRioRrrEs, How CBO ESTIMATES
THE COST OF CLIMATE-CHANGE LEGISLATION 1 (2008), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-
1 3-O8climate.pdf ("When the Congressional Budget Office prepares cost estimates for climate-
change legislation, those estimates reflect what is known as a '25-percent income and payroll
tax offset.' As a result of this offset, the net revenue .. , under a cap-and-trade program ... is
2S percent smaller . .. ."). If instead gross revenues were distributed as rebates, and the rebates
were taxed as additional income, taxing the rebates would be neutral with respect to current
distribution. See id. at 2 ("The only circumstance in which there would not be a 25-percent
offset is when the allowances are given away in a form that effectively makes them taxable
income to the recipient .... "). Distributing net revenues would be regressive.
216. See supra note 102 (explaining that the bottom 5% of the income distribution has
been removed from certain analyses).
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Table 9: Distribution of Revenues by Population Decile and Quintile
Proportionate Rebate: Distribution of Revenues Tracks
_________Distribution of Burdens
Deciles 1st 2d 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10Oth
Percentage
Buardenby 4.0% 5.9% 7.0% 8.0% 9.3% 10% 11.3% 12.8% 14.0% 17.7%
Decile
Dollars per
Decile (in $3.2 $4.6 $5.5 $6.2 $7.3 $7.8 $8.8 $10 $10.9 $13.8
Billions)217 _______
Dollars by
Decile (in $2.4 $3.5 $4.2 $4.8 $5.6 $6.0 $6.8 $7.7 $8.4 $10.6
Billions)
2 18  ___
Quintiles 1st 2d 3d 4th 5th
Percentage
Buren by 9.9% 15.0% 19.3% 24.1% 31.7%
Quintile ___________________________
Dollars by







Quintile (in $5.9 $9.0 $11.6 $14.5 $19.0
Billions) 2 2 0  I_____ I_______________________
B. Choice of Method for Delivery: Institutional Compatibility
There are many ways to deliver a climate change rebate. Fortunately,
several scholars have begun to develop a number of criteria with which to
evaluate alternate systems for delivering public benefits. In their seminal article
217. Rebates would be taxed to recipients. See supra note 215 (explaining the results of
taxing rebates).
218. See supra note 215 (explaining the 25% income and payroll tax offset). Revenue
distributed among each income decile is net of the estimated sum retained by the government to
compensate for the decline in payroll and income tax revenues.
219. See supra note 215 (explaining the revenue results when rebates are taxed). Rebates
would be taxed to recipients.
220. See supra note 215 (explaining the 25% income and payroll tax offset). Revenue
distributed among each income quintile is net of the estimated sum retained by the government
to compensate for the decline in payroll and income tax revenues.
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The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 21David Weisbach and Jacob
Nussim argue that once policymnakers have decided to move forward with a
particular benefit program, they should match the benefit program with the
institutional structure that is most compatible. 2 To do this, policymnakers must
identify the tasks that will need to be performed to implement the program,
determine whether existing institutions measure along the same lines, and
examine whether, within those institutions, the same kinds of expertise would
be required to deliver the new program. 2 By coordinating with other
programs that measure along the same lines, the government may save time and
significant administrative costs that otherwise would be required to set up a
new agency, to train a new bureaucracy, and to operate a new administrative
system. 2
Similarly, Eric Toder suggests a set of criteria by which to evaluate
whether a program would be administered more effectively through the income
tax system or through a direct spending program: (1) expertise needed to
determine eligibility and how funds are to be used, (2) compatibility of a
budgeting and an accounting period in eligibility determinations,
(3) administrative savings and transparency of administrative costs, (4) timing
for delivery of benefits, and (5) nature and frequency of review of those
benefits. 2
In the sections below, this Article evaluates three proposed institutions for
delivering the climate change rebate: funding through utility companies and
gasoline suppliers, through state and federal human services agencies, and
through the tax system. Funding through the tax system is evaluated using
Weisbach, Nussim, and Toder's institutional compatibility Criteria 226 and two
other criteria relevant in determining institutional compatibility: (1) whether
the delivery structure undermines or supports the regulatory goals of the
221. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 995 (2004).
222. See id. at 975 ("The answer [to the question of where a certain program belongs]
depends on institutional factors, not on definitions." (footnote omnitted)).
223. See id. at 996 (using a tax program as an example and observing that "we want to
integrate programs that have close complementarities with the tax system-e.g., programs that
measure along similar margins").
224. See id. (using a tax program as an example and noting the coordination and
specialization benefits that flow from pairing such a program with a similar preexisting program
such as the IRS).
225. See Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending-Does It Make a Difference?, 53 NAT'L TAx
J. 361, 366-69 (2000) (fleshing out his proposed set of criteria).
226. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (identifying Weisbach, Nussim, and
Toder's criteria).
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legislation, and (2) how effective the system is in reaching the targeted
beneficiaries.
1. Utility Companies and Gasoline Distributors
One approach for offsetting distributional impacts that has been
included in legislative proposals for a cap-and-trade system is to allocate free
emissions allowances 227 or to provide rebates to utility companies, 228 on the
understanding that the savings would be passed on to consumers .229 This
proposal has a number of shortcomings. First, if the utility companies simply
pass the savings from their free allocation of allowances to all consumers
through rate reductions, then the central goal of the climate change program
is undercut. 230 Households will not have the financial incentive to reduce
electricity use, and, consequently, consumption of electricity actually would
increase relative to other forms of energy. 23'I As a result of the lower prices in
the electricity sector, more firms would shift their energy use to that sector,
leading to greater emissions from electricity. 232 Consequently, higher levels
of reductions would be required from other energy sectors for aggregate
emissions to stay within the cap.23 Second, this plan would address only the
227. See America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 219 1, 110Oth Cong. § 1201 (as
introduced in Senate, Oct. 18, 2007) (proposing the establishment of a certain quantity of
emission allowances for each calendar year); American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong. § 721 (as placed on calendar in Senate, July 7, 2009) (same).
228. See U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P'siup, A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 13 (2009)
[hereinafter USCAP], available at http://www.us-cap.orgfblueprint/index.asp (recommending
that "an adequate amount of allowance value be provided to U.S. manufacturers' and industries
that will be "particularly challenged by U.S. climate policy"). The United States Climate Action
Partnership is a coalition of large corporations and several nonprofit environmental
organizations, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense
Fund, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, and the World Resources Institute.
229. Paul et al., supra note 58, at 25.
230. See id. ("When electricity consumers do not see the increase in retail electricity prices,
they do not have an incentive to reduce electricity consmption .... [This ... would lead to
more electricity consumption, and .. , it would lead to more emissions from the electricity
sector...."~); CHAD STONE& ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BuDGET&POLICY PRIORITIE,WHY
UTILrIES AREu NOT WELL-SUITED To DELIVER RELIEF To Low- AND MODERATE-INCOME
CONSUMERS IN A CLIMATE BILL 3 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/2- 19-
O9climate.pdf ("People who do not realize that energy costs are going up will be far less likely
to take steps to conserve energy or seek out energy efficiency improvements.").
231. Paul et al., supra note 58, at 25.
232. See id. (finding that lower prices in the electricity sector would "lead to more
emissions from the electricity sector").
233. Id.
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increased electricity costs.234 The impacts from higher transportation fuel
prices or the indirect cost increases in goods and services would not be
covered. 3
Another proposal involves offsetting existing consumer taxes on gas and
diesel. 3 As with home heating and electricity costs, this plan would undercut
the regulatory goals. If consumers do not experience increased prices at the
pump, they will not have the economic incentive to reduce gas consumption, to
acquire more fuel-efficient cars, or to shift to alternative fuels or less carbon-
intensive forms of transportation. Again, this plan, even if paired with the
reductions in household utility rates, would not address the indirect
distributional impacts from the increases in prices of goods and services.
Another important concern with these programs is that the government,
utility companies, and gasoline distributors lack the infrastructure to guarantee
that the offsets will actually reach the consumer. 237 The government would
need to develop additional structures to monitor the unregulated utilities and
gasoline suppliers' delivery of these rebates and price offsets. 3 If the utility
companies were to provide a rebate in the electricity bills based on household
consumption levels, they would need to develop additional structures to gather
additional data from the households in order to deliver a rebate that was
proportionate to the distributional impacts on those households .2 39 The costs
associated with developing and maintaining these structures may be high; they
necessarily would reduce funds available for rebates to consumers .24 vni
the utility companies now had the infrastructure in place to collect and use this
data to deliver rebates equitably, there is still no guarantee that all households
would benefit from the rebate. For rental units, to the extent that utility costs
234. See STONE & GREENsTEiN, supra note 230, at 3 ("The purpose of giving funds to
utility companies is to offset increases in electricity and natural gas bills.").
235. See id. (finding that more than half of the impact from climate change policy "will
come in higher prices for a range of other goods and services, including gasoline and food").
Note that high home energy prices comprise less than half of the burden imposed by climate
change legislation. Id.
236. See USCAP, supra note 228. at 13 ("USCAP recommends the judicious use of
allowance value to ensure that consumers' transportation fuel impacts from allowance prices are
generally proportionate to their electricity and natural gas impacts.").
237. STONE &GREENsTEIN, supra note 230, at 11.
238. Id at 4;USCAP, supra note 228, at 13. Note also that USCAP-which promoted
several different structures to recycle cap-and-trade allocation revenues through utilities
companies and other entities in order to dampen the impacts of climate legislation on
consumers--recommended that structures be developed to make sure that these benefits actually
get to the consumers.
239. STONE & GREENsTEiN, supra note 230, at 2.
240. Id.
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are included in rent, any rebates received by landlords are unlikely to be passed
forward to tenants. 24'This is a particular hazard for low-income families who
are more likely to rent than own their homes. 
242
A related proposal to alleviate the distributional impacts of spikes in home
heating fuels, gas, and electricity to low-income households would expand the
Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) and the Low Income Home Energy
Assistance Program (LIHEAP) .24 3  WAP helps low-income households
weatherize their homes and improve energy efficiency.2 "4 Investment in WAP
and similar programs would improve energy efficiency in homes, reduce
demand for electricity and home heating fuels, and reduce the costs to other
sectors of the economy to achieve emissions requirements .245  LIHEAP
provides vouchers to families suffering financial hardship during adverse
weather conditions that allow them to pay for their home heating and electricity
bills.246 In general, because the benefits under LIHEAP cover the costs that a
household incurs but cannot pay for, LIHEAP generally would undercut
conservation by these low-income households so long as the household was
assured of receiving the LII4EAP benefit. 4 However, this might be an
appropriate use of some of the revenues from a greenhouse gas tax or a cap-
and-trade regime in regions where low-income residents will be impacted
disproportionately because of seasonal temperatures and regional housing
241. Id. at I11 ("[T]he sizeable share of Americans whose utilities are built into their rents
could be left out entirely if climate assistance were delivered through utility companies.").
242. See CHRSTOPHiER E. HERBERT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUsING & URBAN DEV.
HomEOWNERSHip GAPS AMONG Low-NcOME AND MINORrTy BORROWERS AND NEiGHBoRu-ooDs
vii (2005), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/HomeownershipGapsAmong
Low-IncomeandMinority.pdf ("There are also large differences in homeownership rates by
household income.").
243. See STONE & SHAW, supra note 119, at 5-7 ("Additional LIHEAP and WAP funds
also could help low-income families that face particularly high home energy costs as a result of
climate change legislation.... "); see also Burtaw (2008), supra note 24. at 45-47 (advocating
investment of climate change revenues in end-use efficiency programs).
244. STONE & SHAW, supra note 119, at 5.
245. See Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 53 (indicating that the proposed policy "would
lead to lower allowance prices, indicating less cost would be imposed on other sectors of the
economy in order to achieve the specified climate goal").
246. See STONE & SHAW, supra note 119, at 5 (indicating that the current eligibility
requirements are income below 60% of states' median income or 150% of federal poverty
level).
247. See id. at 11I ("[Rloutine consumer assistance through utility companies artificially
lowers households' utility bills, and blunts the 'sticker shock' of higher bills. People who do
not realize that energy costs are going up will be much less likely to take steps to conserve
energy or seek out energy efficiency improvements.").
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stock, such as Florida, the Ohio Valley, and the Northeast. 4 To the extent that
there are regional reductions in claims under the WAP and LIHEAP programs,
the funds should be shifted to those regions with a rise in claimants. In general,
uptake under these programs tends to be lower than optimal. 4 Significant
efforts would need to be made to increase uptake of benefits under both the
WAP and LIHEAP programs in these regions.
2. Human Services Programs
A few advocates have proposed that an array of state and federal human
service agencies deliver rebates to offset distributional impacts of a cap-and-
trade or greenhouse gas tax to low-income households .2 50 These proposals
distribute the rebates as a supplement to existing benefits through the Social
Security, the Supplemental Security Income, Veterans' Affairs, and Railroad
Retirement systems, and state human services systems that deliver Food Stamps
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) .25 ' Higher-income
households would receive the rebate through the tax system. 5 These
advocates argue that these programs provide more certainty that all intended
beneficiaries will receive their rebates because approximately fifteen percent of
households do not currently file income taxes.25
248. See Burtraw (2008), supra note 24, at 45-47 (suggesting that investing greenhouse
gas taxes or cap-and-trade emissions permit revenues in end-use efficiency programs leads to
much lower electricity sector emissions, provides a net gain to the bottom two deciles in the
aggregate, and reduces their losses in the Northeast, the Ohio Valley, and Florida).
249. See STONE & SHAw, supra note 119, at 2 ("This low-income rebate program could
easily be modified so it also provides relief to consumers with somewhat higher incomes."); see
also id. at 10 ("For example, the Weatherization Assistance Program, which helps low-income
households make their homes more energy efficient through measures such as better insulation
and newer appliances, serves only a few hundred thousand homes a year.").
250. See SHARON PARROTTr ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, How TO USE
EXISTING TAx AND BENEFIT SYSTEMS TO OFFSEr CONSUMRvns' HIGHER ENERGY COST'S UNDER AN
EMISSIONS CAP 7-8 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-20-09climate.pdf
(discussing how the proposal may result in some people qualify'ing for multiple climate rebates);
see also CR0 2009, supra note 24, at 22-23 (describing climate change policy revenues under
ACES 2009 to be used in part for energy rebate programs "for households whose gross income
does not exceed 150 percent of the federal poverty level or that are receiving benefits through
the supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, the Medicare Part D low-income subsidy, the
supplemental Security Income Program or other low-income assistance').
251. PARRoTrETAL.,supra note 250, at 7.
252. Id. at 4.
2 53. Id.
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The first consideration is whether the intended beneficiaries actually will
receive the benefit. Uptake under these benefits systems is historically loW.
254
I addition, as benefits are distributed through multiple agencies, coordination
problems will arise. Allocation of climate change revenues among agencies
may pose over- and under-counting problems at the agency level and will
require agencies to coordinate where households currently receive more than
one benefit. Households may be confused about which agency to approach to
apply for benefits if they currently report to more than one agency. Applying
for and maintaining multiple benefits impose significant social costs on
households in terms of time, effort, and expense that should be taken into
consideration when evaluating access and feasibility of institutional design. 5
In addition, it is unfair to require low-income households to travel to more than
one state or federal agency and submit to eligibility evaluations to apply for a
benefit that higher-income households may receive simply by filing their
income tax returns.
Finally, by channeling the rebate through existing benefits programs, the
purpose of the rebate would be disguised. 5 In contrast, segregating a climate
rebate as a separate benefit may signal to households that they may need to
budget for home energy cost increases, to conserve energy, and to shift to
substitutes. 5
3. Income Tax System
Under a proportionate-rebate scheme, the only expertise required to
determine eligibility involves measurement of income and household size.
Because the Internal Revenue Service has expertise in measuring income data
and does so on an annual basis for virtually every U.S. resident, the income tax
system should be considered as a candidate for delivering the rebate.258 In
254. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 221, at 1004-05 (comparing participation rate in
Food Stamp program (70%) to participation rate in EITC (89%)); see also Lawrence Zelenak,
Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1915 (2005) (reporting that among families with children the Food Stamp participation rate is
50%, compared to the 90% participation rate for this group in the EITC).
255. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 221, at 1002-03.
256. Except for the additional funds they are receiving on part of their public benefits, the
rebate and the reason for the rebate would be invisible to the recipients.
257. See RicHARD H. THALER & CAsR. SuNsTEiN, NuDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONSABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPiNESS 188-96 (2008) (discussing the impact of signaling on
behavior).
258. See Toder, supra note 225, at 368 ("There is no point in establishing a new funding
agency when potential subsidy recipients are already settling an annual balance with the IRS.").
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general, policymakers weigh the risks of fraud against concerns about providing
access when setting up eligibility criteria and processes .25 9  Allowing
individuals to identify themselves as eligible enhances the possibility of fraud,
but expands access .260 Employing a strict eligibility determination process as a
condition for receiving the benefit reduces fraud but decreases access .26 1 The
economic constraints imposed on lower-income households from climate
change legislation point toward extending broader access through self-declared
eligibility.262 In addition, the risk of fraud is low. A proportionate rebate
increases with income. Because reporting higher income would expose the
household to higher taxes, households are unlikely to overstate their income to
receive a higher rebate.
To issue the rebate, the only other variable that must be measured is
household size. The Internal Revenue Service also tracks this information
through the annual return filing process.26 Households are required to provide
social security numbers for each household member. Because the Internal
Revenue Service has expertise in verifying income and household size, and
because individuals can identify themselves as eligible recipients of the rebate,
the income tax system appears to be a good choice of institution for delivery of
the climate change rebate.
The income tax system also has unique value in providing a well-
recognized infrastructure for delivery of cash reimbursements. Because of the
annual income-reporting requirement, the tax code provides an economy of
scope not available through other programs .2 64 This would allow the program
to have extensive penetration among the pool of beneficiaries from the first year
of implementation. The income tax system has a demonstrated track record in
delivering rebates to low-income households; refundable tax credits under the
EITC program have achieved nearly a ninety percent uptake rate among
259. See id. (discussing the trade-off between maximizing access for eligible beneficiaries
and minimizing fraud by those ineligible for a benefit).
260. Id. at 368.
26 1. Id.
262. See Zelenak, supra note 254, at 1915 ("[T]he participation rate (that is, the percentage
of eligible persons who receive benefits) is much higher with the EITC's self declared eligibility
than with the Food Stamp program's precertification requirement.").
263. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY-INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FORM 1040: U.S.
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx RETURN 2009, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl 040.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 20 10) (showing tax form and information collected on household size) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
264. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 221, at 996 ('[T]he IRS has expertise in
measuring along those margins, and it exhibits economies of scope in such measurement.").
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families with children. 25By using infr-astructure with which the public is
familiar, policymnakers may devote more resources to the actual rebates and to
outreach targeting populations that do not usually file tax returns, such as low-
income households, elderly populations receiving Social Security, and disabled
individuals receiving Supplemental Security Income. 266 In contrast with the
eligibility determination process within health and human service agencies,
both nonprofit and for-profit firms are available to assist taxpayers in
designating their eligibility for the benefit. 6
Another consideration in the choice of an institution is whether there are
likely to be savings in administration of the program. Inclusion of the climate
change rebate within the income tax system would permit implementation of
the program using existing infr-astructure. This will reduce the costs of
implementing the system and reduce enforcement and compliance costs by an
order of magnitude 2 68 thereby increasing administrative efficiency. 269 There
are significant savings from using an existing measurement system to process
the same information that must be provided by taxpayers in their annual
returns. While the Internal Revenue Service might require additional
manpower to enforce eligibility requirements and to measure program
performance, no additional administrative structure would be required.
Beneficiaries also save costs, time, and effort associated with application and
265. Zelenak, supra note 254, at 1915 n. 197; Leonard E. Buman & Deborah 1. Kobes,
EITC Reaches More Eligible Families Than TANF, Food Stamps, 98 TAX NOTEs 1769, 1769
(2003).
266. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 221, at 980 ("[T]hese feaues ... are a key
benefit of integration into the tax system because they take advantage of the existing
infrastructure of tax collection. That is, integration allows for economies of scope in policy
implementation with the resulting savings in administering and complying with the system.").
267. The Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program provides tax assistance for low- and
moderate-income households, and Tax Counseling for the Elderly, sponsored by the Internal
Revenue Service and the American Association of Retired Persons, helps citizens aged sixty and
older to file their taxes. See Michael Evangelist, National Community Tax Coalition: A Project
of the Center for Economic Progress 1, http://www.tax-coatition.org/advocacy/materials/
VITAFunding PolicyBrief.pdf ("Community Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA)
programs offer free tax help and related financial services to low-income individuals and
families."). Jackson Hewitt and H&R Block also provide assistance. See H&R Block
Announces Programs to Help Taxpayers Claim EITC, Other Benefitsfor Low-Income Families,
Bus. WiRE, Feb. 11, 2008, http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/tax-law-income-tax/6779584-
1.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2010) ("$30 Billion in Government Benefits Claimed through H&R
Block in 2007") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
268. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 221, at 1006 (comparing the costs of
administering the Food Stamps program with the costs associated with administering the EITC).
269. See id. at 100 1-03 ("The argument for the integration of transfer programs such as the
EITC and the FSP into the tax system is that integration enhances administrative efficiency by
reducing bureaucratic costs and complexity.").
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eligibility ordeals at multiple agencies. They would be required to invest no
more effort than they would by filing their annual income tax statement. In
addition, the tax system provides transparency to the public because households
self-designate their eligibility.
270
Another positive benefit in providing a financial benefit through the tax
code is that it becomes easier to coordinate the step-up under the proportionate
rebate for each decile with the phase-outs of other benefit programs, such as the
EITC, the Child Care Credit, Food Stamps, and Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF). 27' A number of public benefits have phase-out
schedules in which the benefit declines as income increases. 7 The combined
effect of multiple phase-outs may impose a higher marginal tax rate.27 When
the ranges of incomes over which the phase-outs occur coincide, the marginal
tax increases can be stark.27 Inclusion of financial benefits within the tax code
permits these phase-outs to be coordinated so that taxpayers experience a more
rational progression of rate increases. 7 This coordination advantage suggests
that the climate change rebate is a good candidate for inclusion in the tax
system.
Finally, the budgeting and accounting periods used to determine eligibility
for the rebate would be compatible with the annual income tax return filing
period. 7 This is because the goal of the climate change rebate is to ameliorate
270. Id at 980.
271. See id. at 1002 ("Further benefits to coordination arise through the interaction of tax
and transfer programs on a variety of margins.").
2 72. Id.
273. See id. ("For example, phase-outs of means-tested programs increase effective
marginal tax rates, and failure to coordinate phase-outs can create extremely high rates for low-
income individuals.").
274. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income Households, 84
T~x NoTcs 1191, 1191 (1999) (explaining how effective marginal tax rates on low-income
households can exceed 100 percent as a result of income-conditioned benefits phase-outs
combined with income and labor taxes).
275. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 221, at 995 ("[Plutting a program into the tax
system can be seen as a decision for simplicity."); see also id. at 1002 ("[Pjhase-outs of means-
tested programs increase effective marginal tax rates, and failure to coordinate phase-outs can
create extremely high rates for low-income individuals."). Note that while the proposed
proportionate rebate will increase as income does, it will be necessary to coordinate the
programs to avoid disqualification errors that could otherwise result in the other benefit
programs.
276. See Toder, supra note 225, at 367-68 ("Given that most individuals and businesses
already file tax returns, a new tax incentive, even though it makes the tax law more complex,
also has the advantage of not requiring a new point of contact between a citizen and a
government agency.").
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the impacts of climate change legislation on households in accordance with
actual current consumption patterns. 7
If the tax system is the best structure for delivering the climate change
rebate, the question becomes, "What form should the rebate take?" Because the
economic incidence of climate change legislation tracks with consumption and
income, a number of proposals might be used: a reduction in payroll tax rates,
a reduction in income tax rates, income tax deductions, nonrefundable tax
credits, or refundable tax credits.
As mentioned above, using revenue from climate change legislation to
modify income tax or payroll tax rates would exclude large numbers of some of
the most vulnerable households. Individuals who are not earning wages (such
as the unemployed and the elderly) and those who are not taxed on wages (such
as the disabled and certain state workers) would not benefit from the reduction
in payroll and income taxes. Alternative policies provide for delivery of
deductions or nonrefundable tax credits to households. A deduction would
278
benefit only the thirty-five percent of tax units that itemize. We
household receives a benefit in the form of a deduction, the higher the income
of the household, the higher the benefit, based on the marginal tax rate for the
household. Therefore, offsets in the form of a deduction would be
regressive.279 Furthermore, households with no tax liability-those with the
lowest income-would receive no benefit from an offset delivered as a
nonrefundable credit or a deduction, even though they would be impacted most
severely.280 Tax deductions and nonrefundable tax credits benefit only those
with tax liability; thirty-seven percent of tax units have no liability.28
In contrast, a refundable tax credit will reach households at all levels of
the income spectrum. Some have suggested that policymnakers expand the
EITC program. 8 While this might be appropriate if the rebate were going
277. Several recent studies have shown that household consumption does track with annual
income. See Bull et al., supra note 24. at 148 (confirming that consumption tracks with annual
income); see also Carroll, supra note 86, at 2 (arguing that consumers with important income
uncertainty who are sufficiently impatient set average consumption growth equal to their
average labor income growth regardless of tastes; when wealth is below the savings target for
emergencies they save and when wealth is above the target they consume).
278. Batchelder et al., supra note 89, at 53-54.
279. Id. at 49-50.
280. Id. at 54.
281. Id. at 53-54.
282. See CBO 2009, supra note 24, at 22-23 (describing the plan under ACES 2009 to
expand the earned income tax credit payable to individuals without qualifying children). But
see STONE & SHAw, supra note 119, at 3 (suggesting that a separate climate tax credit be
extended to provide relief to middle-income consumers).
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only to lower-income households with at least one working adult, it will
exclude many low-income households that do not have at least one working
adult, including the elderly, the unemployed, and those with disabilities .28 1 If
included in the EITC, the proportionate rebate would expand the EITC well
beyond its current parameters and eligibility standards .284 In addition, given the
general disfavor of the EITC politically,285 it may be advantageous to insulate
climate change legislation for reasons of political economy. To avoid
entangling climate change legislation with political battles over the EITC and to
avoid complicating enforcement of the EITC program with broader income
eligibility requirements, the proportionate rebate should be offered as a separate
credit. Finally, a separate credit may provide an important behavioral signal to
households to conserve energy and to budget for cost increases over the
following year, providing benefits to both the household and the
environment. 8
4. Optimal Delivery System Based on Institutional Compatibility
The goal of a climate change rebate is to address the distributional impacts
of climate change policy. Because these distributional impacts are measured in
accordance with and track with income and household size, a proportionate
rebate should be delivered as a refundable tax credit through the tax system.
The Internal Revenue Service has expertise in this area and measures along the
lines of household income and size. Because of this institutional compatibility,
delivery of the rebate through the tax system will reduce administrative costs
during deployment, operation, and enforcement, leaving more revenues for
rebates. The tax system is the only institutional structure with the capacity to
reach virtually all households impacted by climate change legislation, and,
because it is familiar to these households, uptake will be maximized in a very
short period. Use of some climate change revenues to increase the budget for
WAP and LIHEAP may be warranted, however, to cure regional impacts
283. The eligibility rules for the EITC are outlined on the IRS website. Basic
Qualifications, http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/abouteitc/basicqualifications/ (last visited Feb.
23, 20 10) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
284. Id.
285. See Steve Holt, The Earned Income Tax Credit at Age 30: What We Know, The
Brookings Institution, Research Brief, Feb. 2006, 18-23 (providing an overview of the concerns
and controversies associated with the EITC).
286. See THALER & SuNsTEiN, supra note 257, at 188-96 (discussing the impact of
signaling on behavior).
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associated with cost increases related to seasonal temperature changes and poor
housing stock.
In contrast, other proposals have serious flaws and can undermine the
goals of climate change legislation itself. Proposals to mitigate climate change
policy impacts through rate reductions in gas taxes and electricity rates would
undermine the efficiency goals of the climate change legislation: to encourage
conservation and shifts to clean fuels and products. To maintain the cap in the
face of rate reductions in specific energy sectors, other energy sectors will be
forced to increase rates; this will result in expensive shifts to the lower-cost
energy sectors without a corresponding increase in conservation or energy
efficiency or a shift to non-fossil fuel substitutes. In addition, rate reductions in
gasoline prices or electricity rates will not correct fully for the indirect
distributional impacts of price increases on goods and services. Finally, costly
administrative structures would be required to ensure that the economic benefit
of allocations of free permits or tax abatements to unregulated utilities
companies and transportation fuel suppliers would be passed through to
consumers.
Delivery of the benefit through increases in existing benefits programs
such as Food Stamps, TANF, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income,
and other targeted programs would result in inefficiencies because of
coordination problems, low uptake, and the social costs to low-income
households in applying for and maintaining eligibility in an array of programs.
Deploying a climate change rebate through programs generally targeted toward
low-income households also might undermine the feasibility of climate change
legislation as a matter of political economy.28 7 Furthermore, if climate change
funds are used simply to increase the amount of benefits under existing
programs, beneficiaries are unlikely to be made aware of the need to conserve
energy or budget for increased energy and other Costs. 2 8
IV Conclusion
Climate change legislation is designed to internalize the negative
externalities associated with the consumption of fossil fuels-the adverse
effects of the aggregation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the
287. The distributional impacts of climate change policy are broad. Limiting the rebates to
low-income households raises redistribution issues. Supra notes 150-53 and accompanying
text.
288. Except for an increase in the amount of benefits they are receiving, the rebate will be
invisible to low-income recipients.
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atmosphere. Whether in the form of a command-and-control system, a cap-
and-trade system, or a greenhouse gas tax, the imposition of environmental
controls will have distributional impacts. By measuring the distribution of
these benefits and burdens, the incidence, and alternative climate change
policies, policymnakers are empowered to make important decisions about which
policy structure to choose and where adjustments need to be made to ensure
that the benefits and burdens are distributed appropriately.
Alternative climate change policy structures distribute the burdens and the
benefits of the legislation in different patterns. Performance standards are
inefficient because the aggregate costs for all firms to meet those standards are
higher than they would be under a market-based regulatory mechanism. This
produces a pattern of incidence that varies by region depending on the fuel
source and the age of the energy facilities. A cap-and-trade system with
grandfathered permits is highly regressive, transferring former consumer
surplus to shareholders of fossil fuel energy suppliers and producing little
revenue to offset adverse distributional impacts. Both a greenhouse gas tax and
a cap-and-trade system with auctioned permits are superior instruments for
regulating greenhouse gases because they are efficient and generate revenue
that the government may use to offset adverse distributional impacts.
There are a number of proposals to address the distributional impacts of
the legislation. Equal rebates, undergirded by both egalitarian and utilitarian
principles, are subject to criticism because "everyday libertarianism" questions
whether rights to the commons should be distributed on a per-capita basis and
because equal rebates redistribute income from the wealthy to lower-income
households. A number of economists advocate the use of climate change
revenues to improve efficiency by reducing income tax and labor tax rates.
This proposal fails to address the distributional impacts of climate change
legislation for several of the most vulnerable populations, such as the elderly,
the unemployed, and the disabled. If, instead, revenues from climate change
regulation are used to deliver a rebate that is proportionate to income and scaled
according to household size, the distributional impacts are neutralized within
each income decile. However, because rent-seeking by firms or political trades
may result in less revenue with which to offset all of the distributional impacts,
rebates should be directed preferentially to households within the lower deciles
of income; these households suffer disproportionately from the impacts of the
greenhouse gas tax or cap-and-trade regime as a percentage of after-tax
household income.
In identifying a mechanism for delivering climate change revenues,
Congress should ensure that the mechanism supports the climate change goals,
addresses both direct and indirect impacts, and reaches all intended
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beneficiaries. Rate reductions in utility prices delivered by utility companies
and gasoline tax reductions delivered through gas distributors fail to address the
indirect costs to consumers from climate change policy, require an extensive
bureaucratic apparatus to administer, and undermine the central legislative
goal-to reduce consumption of fossil fuels through an artificially induced
price increase. Rebates delivered along with other existing benefits through
health and human services agencies show historically low uptake, give rise to
under- or over-payments because of difficulties in coordinating the payments
with benefits from other programs, and mask any signal to beneficiaries that
they should conserve energy and budget for price increases.
In contrast, by employing existing infrastructure available through the tax
code and the expertise available through the Internal Revenue Service,
Congress may expedite efficient deployment of the program, maximize uptake
of the benefit by the target communities, and ensure cost savings in
administration and compliance. Based on the public's general familiarity with
the system, the government may deliver the benefit without significant outlays
for administration and outreach. While some resources will need to be devoted
to extend access to Social Security beneficiaries and recipients of Supplemental
Security Income that do not usually file income tax returns, most households
are familiar with the system. Inclusion of the benefit in the tax code also would
permit the phase-in of the climate change rebate to be coordinated with the
phase-outs of the EITC, the Child Care Credit, and other direct benefit
programs, ensuring that households receive all of the benefits to which they are
entitled. Only the tax system provides the economy of scale and scope to reach
full penetration of the market within the first few years of administration,
delivers a rebate that offsets both direct and indirect impacts, saves low-income
clients from multiple eligibility ordeals, and advances climate change
legislative goals by signaling conservation.
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